Reddit reviews Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

This is a highly controversial area and I think that the first thing to consider is the language that you use when describing the Allied bomber offensives in Europe or the Pacific. I don't want to argue semantics, but words such as "atrocities" are emotionally charged and suggest that you have a biased agenda; this would be a shame because studying the bombing campaigns is a fascinating way to consider morality in warfare and the effect that our modern moral standards can have on our view of the past.

Moving on you need a range of sources which can give you a perspective on the campaigns as well as some eyewitness accounts. My knowledge is predominantly on the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) in Europe agreed upon at Casablanca in 1943, the aim of which was to achieve the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany (a goal agreed at the Washington Conference in 1942). Whilst studying any campaign it is important to bear in mind the goal it is trying to achieve (the "Ends" in military parlance) so you can assess whether the tactics ("ways") and resources ("means") were appropriate or proportionate.

You also need to bear in mind that the major protagonists of the CBO, the British and Americans, went about things in different ways. The Royal Air force was instituted as an independent service in 1918 because of a belief in the effectiveness of strategic bombing and so it's raison d'etre was always to take the fight to the enemy, in the words of Churchill:

> The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means of victory.

By contrast the US Army Air Forces were formed in 1941 to provide a dedicated organisation responsible for air power, but because it remained subordinate to the army and shared much of the army's ethos it was prepared early on to think more critically about its role and often tried to be a more precise instrument than the RAF.

In any case strategic air power was a blunt instrument. Although the Allies made great inroads into developing more accurate equipment and tactics, bombing was still inaccurate and inefficient and the only way to effectively attack a particular target was generally to send as many bombers as possible - more bombs dropped equals more chance of hitting the target. Unfortunately this increases collateral damage considerably.

The effectiveness of area bombing is still a matter for debate. Questions were asked about the effectiveness of strategic bombing form the start of the war with a famous debate held in the House of commons in early 1942 during which Prof Hill, an MP and Cambridge Don, pointed out that the Blitz had had a smaller impact on British production than the Easter holidays had. This was all in response to the Butt report of 1941 which showed that bombing was far less accurate and effective than widely thought:

> Any examination of night photographs taken during night bombing in June and July points to the following conclusions:

> Of those aircraft recorded as attacking their target, only one in three got within 5 miles].

> Over the French ports, the proportion was two in three; over Germany as a whole, the proportion was one in four; over the Ruhr it was only one in ten.

> In the full moon, the proportion was two in five; in the new moon it was only one in fifteen. ...

> All these figures relate only to aircraft recorded as attacking the target; the proportion of the total sorties which reached within 5 miles is less than one-third. The conclusion seems to follow that only about one-third of aircraft claiming to reach their target actually reached it.

Finally in an era of total war, civilian populations were considered a legitimate target. The Fourth Geneva Convention affording protection to civilians in war were not instituted until 1949, and breaking the German populations will to fight was seen by many as legitimate way of achieving unconditional surrender. Interestingly this same reasoning has been used by proponents of the current global salafi jihad to justify attacks such as 9/11. It should be noted that German attacks on the UK did not break morale and the CBO does not appear to have had any serious impact on the German will to fight.

So with this in mind I recommend:

[The World at War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_at_War) is an extraordinary documentary which balances accessibility and depth very well. Episode 12 Whirlwind: Bombing Germany has interviews with Allied and German commanders and some superb eyewitness accounts. I would go so far as to suggest that you are obliged to show it to your students.

[Bomber Command by Max Hastings](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Bomber-Command-Pan-Military-Classics/dp/0330513613)

[Bombing to Win by Robert Pape](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Bombing-Win-Coercion-Cornell-Security/dp/0801483115)

[Bomber Boys* by Patrick Bishop](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Bombing-Win-Coercion-Cornell-Security/dp/0801483115)

The Bomber War Trilogy by Kevin Wilson

I could write much much more, but it's late in the UK and I need to retire. I'm sure there will be many more contributors here including those knowledgeable about air power in the Pacific theatre and I will cheerfully answer any questions you have, assuming you're happy to wait 12 hours or so!

Robert Pape wrote one of the best books on bombing I've ever read.

http://www.amazon.com/Bombing-Win-Coercion-Cornell-Security/dp/0801483115