Reddit reviews Libyan Air Wars. Part 2: 1985–1986 (Africa@War)

It was a situation that developed gradually, over nearly 15 years - and was as related to 'terrorism', as to multiple other issues.

Actual fundamental issue was Qaddafi's opinion along which Arabs were 'free' to do to the West what the West was doing to the Arab world, particularly through its support for Israel.

It could be said the story began in 1972, when Libya opened an initiative to establish a union with Egypt and Syria, aiming to create a super-state that could confront Israel on equal terms (through the combination of its total economic- and military power). Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat did not really like this idea, but welcomed Libyan financial support; Syrian President Hafez al-Assad entered closer cooperation with Libya. As a result of this initiative, some of Egyptian military units were put under Libyan control and deployed in Libya, and Qaddafi came to the idea to use them for his designs - many of which were considered 'too radical' foremost by Sadat, not to talk about Western powers. For example, he ordered an Egyptian submarine to sink the liner SS Queen Elisabeth, or delivered four Egyptian Il-28s to the (Soviet- and Cuban-supported) government of South Yemen etc. This caused first tensions.

During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War (also 'Yom Kippur' or 'Ramadan War'), Qaddafi would have loved to have Libyan military involved on the side of Egypt and Syria; but, these kept him out of the loop until the war began, and then the Libyan military proved ill-prepared and too small for that kind of a conflict. Indeed, it proved even unable to intercept US aircraft underway to Israel. Therefore, Qaddafi claimed the entire Gulf of Syrte for Libyan territorial waters. Eventually, he became so incensed over Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's 'lack of cooperation' with him, that not only the plan for an union was shelved, but Qaddafi began fiercely criticising Sadat, and four years later provoked a short war between Egypt and Libya (which Libya lost).

In period 1973-1981, and along that claim for the Gulf of Syrte, Libyan armed forces several times attacked various foreign ships and aircraft passing off the Libyan coast - several times even well away from the claimed area. For example, in September 1973, two Mirages attacked an Italian Navy warship with 30mm cannons, killing one of Italian sailors. In period 1979-1980, Libyans repeatedly caused tensions over Maltese independence and Malta's cooperation with Italy; in 1980, Qaddafi attempted to stage a coup in Tunisia etc. On the other hand, Western powers were maintaining a close watch on Libyan military build-up, and some of their reconnaissance aircraft are said to have flown not only along Libyan borders, but deep over Libya too. Correspondingly, Libyan military attempted to intercept these and there were several related incidents. For example, on 16 September 1980, two MiG-25s intercepted an USAF Boeing RC-135 ELINT/SIGINT-reconnaissance aircraft over the Mediterranean. When the US crew ignored their orders to distance, one of them fired an air-to-air missile - which missed. Five days later, five Mirage 5s intercepted another RC-135, and had to be forced away by two F-14 Tomcats of the US Navy.

Meanwhile, in December 1979, Libyan demonstrators chanting pro-Iranian slogans stormed and burned part of the US embassy in Tripoli, and in February 1980, demonstrators sacked the French embassy in Tripoli and the consulate in Benghazi. After Great Britain expulsed several Libyan diplomats the British embassy in Tripoli was fire-bombed, in June 1980.

Eventually, Libya began accusing the USA of planning anti-Qaddafi coups, and began deploying agents to the USA to assassinate various Libyan emigrants. Furthermore, Qaddafi began supporting various militant and terrorist groups around the world, ranging from different Palestinian groups, to the IRA in Great Britain and the Red Army in Japan. Clearly, not only the USA considered this an act of state-sponsored terrorism; other Western governments did the same. But, the administration of President Carter was too preoccupied with the US embassy crisis in Iran but to do anything against Libya, while such governments like those of France and/or Italy tended to ignore Libyan activity because of their economic interests in the country.

Overall, by the time Reagan entered the office, in January 1981, the situation was already quite tense. Unsurprisingly, Regan issued a new set of Rules of Engagement for US aircraft operating off Libya, and then ordered a 'Freedom of Navigation' exercise 'inside' the Gulf of Syrte, in order to challenge Libyan claims, for August 1981. That's how the next direct clash took place, resulting in the famous downing of two Libyan Su-22 fighter-bombers by USN's F-14 Tomcats.

Immediately following that incident, no Libya-related terrorist attacks were observed. But, through 1982 and 1983, Qaddafi began supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and then 'persuasive circumstantial evidence' emerged that Libya was behind the act of mining southern approaches to the Suez Canal, in 1984.

Foremost, during 1984 and 1985, a series of hijackings of passenger aircraft took place in the skies over the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This phase culminated in the hijacking of the Italian passenger liner Achille Lauro, and terrorist attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna, in 1985.

Now, while the US intelligence agencies found very little evidence for Libyan involvement in most of these affairs, Qaddafi's public support for terror exposed his country to a military retaliation. Reagan - i.e. US intelligence services - actually knew that it was Syria and Iran that were actually behind most of terrorist attacks in question. But, Libya was isolated on the international plan and its military lacked similar capabilities to those of Syria and Iran. Correspondingly, he picked Libya. Intention was to provide an example: you run campaigns of terror against us, we hit back with military force.

By early 1986, the US military launched operations of provoking Libyan military over the Gulf of Syrte, and Washington began providing aid to the government of Chad (northern half of which was occupied by Libya since 1981). These two affairs then culminated in a series of US-Libyan clashes in March and April 1986 (Operations Attain Document, Prairie Fire, and El Dorado Canyon), and then Libyan military defeats in Chad (Toyota Wars), in 1987-1988.

Finally, in 1988, Libyans (apparently with some support from Iran and Syria) bombed the Pan Am's Flight 103 (see Lockerbie) and UTA's Flight 772. However, instead of launching a punitive military action, the USA and France decided to find a solution through international diplomacy and courts. Libya was put under massive economic sanctions and embargos, and several of its citizens indicted for involvement in terrorist attacks.

Sources of reference:

• El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi, particularly useful for detailed description of Regan's decision-making process in relation to Libya, but also related US military operations;
  
  
• Libyan Air Wars, Volume 1, Volume 2, and Volume 3, for the 'full story' - i.e. all of these affairs put within their context (then, the US-Libyan confrontations of the 1980s were very much a part of far more complex affairs, as described above) - and a very detailed description of the Libyan military build-up (including not only the air force, but ballistic missile capability and even WMDs) and US, French, Italian and other military operations against Libya of the 1970s and 1980s.

What is your background on this topic? I typically assume that people have only a cursory understanding when talking to them online, but this seems not to be the case here.

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>Yes, which is exactly what happened - and then a number of times - during the Iran-Iraq War, especially so during most fierce battles, in 1986-1987.

As in barrels exploded? Or as in the N+1th shot exploded the barrel, these are not the same thing.

>I'm not of the sort 'pedantic argument', or 'mathematically, this is inaccurate', but of the sort, 'goes out, finds Iraqi T-72-tankers, interviews them'. We're living in the times of the internet, after all: it's anything but hard to find them (ironically, reactions by people like Paul and James were very similar to yours - when they were on the receiving end of similar recommendations, back in mid-2000s).

I have no idea who these people are, why are you referring to them by their first names?

What are the recommendations and reactions?

To go find interviews/Iraqi tankers online?

There's a whole book based off of Iran/Iraq war interviews, the one on the F-14s, it's not exactly well regarded as a reliable source.


Nor, honestly can the anecdotes of people who performed so profoundly poorly in combat really be considered that definitive a way of finding out the truth about the events that occurred.

I'm not saying they don't have value, but I'm not sure that pointing at them and saying "there is the truth, reconsider" is advisable.




>Why? Because prejudice and supposition makes people thinking they never took care to carry enough spare barrels with them into training, and especially into the battle?

Well, to be honest this is kind of a form of arguing backwards;

Even when the Iraqis could see there targets and were in range they rarely landed hits.

There must be an explanation for this.

Zaloga and a T-72 blog are not definitive sources, I'll readily admit but I wouldn't consider some hypothetical tanker anecdotes as trumping them either.


You're correct in that I haven't done any serious research on the Iraqi army training. I don't claim to be anything close to an authority.

>try to find yourself few tankers of the former 10th Armoured Brigade (first Iraqi Army unit equipped with T-72s): gents in question have 'books' to say about the type.

Do you have any links?

I would love to read them, I'll look myself when I have time but a starting point would go a long ways.

>My co-author Martin Smisek has found loads of relevant papers (including reports about related negotiations and contracts for Libyan orders, plus Syrian and Iraqi complaints) in archives of the Czech Republic during research for Volumes 4, 5, and 6 of this series: http://www.harpia-publishing.com/galleries/AMV4/index.html - and Volumes 1 and 2 of this series: http://www.amazon.com/Libyan-Air-Wars-Part-1985-1986/dp/1910294535/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1462253442&sr=1-4
Further to this, there are several biographies by top Iraqi and Syrian military commanders (in Arabic) citing similar issues (even the former C-in-C SyAAF, Moukiiad, is discussing this issue in his auto-biography, published in Damascus in 2001, because he was the boss of Syrian military commission for acquisition, in the 1980s).

I see.