(Part 2) Best medical psychology books according to redditors
We found 108 Reddit comments discussing the best medical psychology books. We ranked the 56 resulting products by number of redditors who mentioned them. Here are the products ranked 21-40. You can also go back to the previous section.
![The Masculine Self [THIRD EDITION]](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/51rRSDgOZlL.jpg)
Conclusion: Burn It Down. God, I want to read this now. In the meantime, there's always The Burnout Society (everyone should read it).
i hope that list isn't overwhelming. internal family systems/parts work has been so so so beneficial to me as i work on my own growth/recovery, so i've done a lot of reading to try to absorb as much as i can. i hope that as you learn more about your parts & how to interact with each of them that the self-compassion & tenderness you've expressed here will just grow & grow & become second nature/as automatic as breathing, & that you will heal more & more deeply. 💚
> Your argument boils down to "Peterson said this idea is based in Pragmatism, but his argument isn't included in any textbooks on pragmatism." Well, sure. He's not reiterating American Pragmatism, he is putting forth something a little different. I think it's a bit of a strawman/sleight of hand to say "ah this doesn't fit perfectly into the Pragmatist box so it's not valid". Like it doesn't necessarily matter what Rorty's opinion on Peterson would be. There's no truth value inherent to Rorty's opinion inherently.
I didn't make an argument, so I can tell you're already misreading my comment. And even if I did, reframing it the way you did is incredibly uncharitable. Reframing like that is a good way to pick a fight, though. I'd have thought a JBP fan would be sensitive to that. Christ.
I was saying: I consider myself a pragmatist and find JBP's use of pragmatic ideas confusing, so understanding pragmatism probably isn't sufficient for understanding JBP. 'Check out American Pragmatism' isn't going to cut it.
(Well, ok, I guess that is technically an argument, but I don't think it's what you meant.)
And then I went on to describe aspects of JBP's thought/approach that I find hard to square with pragmatism. I'm not making a definitive case that he's not a pragmatist, whatever that might mean. I'm more talking out loud about my own confusion.
Lastly, your response is incredibly arrogant. What do you know of my understanding of pragmatism? "Textbooks?" Read my some of my top comments and posts and you'll see that I've (successfully) staked my livelihood on pragmatism. So, I'm not unlike JBP in that regard, I suppose.
> I mean, a 100% Pragmatist would assert that the Pragmatist definition of truth is superior, literally by definition of what it means to be a Pragmatist fully, right?
Absolutely not. Asserting something is superior would require understanding the myriad of ways that thing interfaces with with the world. You'd have to be pretty arrogant to claim that.
> If a Pragmatist doesn't advocate for a Pragmatist definition of truth over other types, then what does it even mean to consider them a Pragmatist?
A relevant parable: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant
It's not about advocating for one type of truth other other truths, it's about the way we approach the concept of truth. At the end of it all, you have to keep in mind that you might be utterly confused about what's really going on, like the blind man who thinks the elephant's trunk is a snake. Nominally, the blind man is wrong, but nevertheless the fact that he said it is a snake tells us something about both the blind man and the elephant, assuming we're willing to investigate deeper.
That process of inquiry, will, in the limit, converge to the truth. (This is how both Peirce and Dewey talk about truth. James is the one who said "That which is useful is true", which I think is more digestible but less accurate.)
In mathematics, for example, I'm not going to be using the pragmatic theory of truth because I've constrained the domain of discourse in a way that makes it unnecessary. I think there is a way to subsume this flavor of truth in a pragmatic concept of truth, but I don't know how useful or correct it is.
JBP is really bad at this stuff, BTW. He chides Sam Harris for having a "13 year old atheist's understanding of religion", but has a first-year undergrad's understanding of mathematics:
The fact that he's been confused about Gödel for 20+ years while still being confident enough to write/tweet stuff like that really gives me pause.
> Again, this is the logical fallacy/sleight of hand argument you made earlier about "No True Pragmatist", but Pragmatism is about asserting a method of obtaining truth that has more merit than other methods. That's no less sure than Peterson's Maps of Meaning perspective.
This is almost exactly wrong. I mean, you can read Peirce and he talks about this explicitly. Pragmatism has a meta-theory of inquiry. Peirce and Dewey talk at length about inquiry and the properties a process of inquiry must have if it is to be self-corrective and truth-converging.
See, e.g., Dewey's Logic - The Theory of Inquiry.
I would challenge JBP to identify what self-corrective aspects his "Maps of Meaning" system has. 50 years from now, how will his system have evolved? What directions might it evolve in? What questions can't it answer? By what process to we reconcile his way of understanding with other facts?
These are things I've never heard him talk about, but I admit I'm turned off because he seems less concerned with refining his system and more concerned with demonstrating that his system accounts for everything thrown its way.
To me, this is one of the most damning critiques of religion. Let's say we're investigating God. What has religion taught us about God in the last 100 years that it was not able to teach us 1000 years ago?
There might be "truth" in religion, in the sense that it maps onto something about our psyche, but by what process is it converging towards anything?
Even JBP realizes this is a problem from a pragmatic perspective, which I think is why he always argues that the Christ story is the maximally tragic tale and therefore no refinement is necessary insofar as it's meant to capture some kind of tragic archetype.
Well... (sigh). It's not all "wrong," but some of it does not square with...
For that... see this: Stress Reduction for Distress Tolerance & Emotion Regulation... and Vice-Versa.
I'm not really sure, but I'd surmise a few reasons:
From the humanities angle, on initial appraisal his ideas look like both a kind of essentialism and /or metaphysical in a 'mystical' sense, both categories of which sit in difficult or contested spaces of perceived relevancy. Again it depends on the institution and the individuals involved.
I read an article once, I forget where now, which concerned the history of how psychoanalysis became proliferated in the academy in France primarily through friends and compatriots of Freud who championed his work and spread his ideas. Jung didn't receive the same support or validation via this route (this possibly also relates to the split between Jung and Freud; the affects of it reverberated in numerous ways). French critical theory and philosophy for example, and of the twentieth century at least, hugely influential in the arts, aesthetic and literary theory, is heavily Freudian and/or neo-Freudian. Jung is virtually absent here.
From the sciences side his ideas find difficulties in being experimentally verified (even though, intriguingly, his conceptions are tracking out as correspondent to hypothetical positions being established in regions of neuroscience or work with dreams for example. This is discussed in papers and books by a neuroscientist Erik Goodwyn, and Jungian analysts Jean Knox and John Haule, among others).
Alongside this the thing with Jung is you have to do stuff and engage regions of consciousness both interiorly and externally in a different manner; ego becomes a shifted smaller center of consciousness, assumptions are deconstructed, everything initially starts to fall apart, looks frightening or becomes strange (i.e., psyche and world become entangled in a puzzling manner, projections have to be identified, reversed, owned etc etc). There's effort and work involved in employing his ideas, and they're an idiosyncratic paradigm, they aren't easily able to be plugged into more contemporary conceptions and models unless this has become developed in ones thought and, arguably, post-Jungian developments have become factored in (such as is pointed out in the OP here for example; others ideas and models trace back to or out of Jung).
The process he elucidates and maps - which he is also careful to highlight he was only a pioneer in and others need to pick up the work to continue it - is transformative and significantly involves altered states and conditions of consciousness, also a still controversial and contested space with varying degrees of receptivity or spaces of validation in the academy (again it depends). It is also slow and painful and deeply complex with multiple layers, possibilities of reading and entry points. Where is the time or space to really engage in this kind of material in academic performance contexts? I struggled with it in a fine arts context (in the end I decided I wasn't really doing art, nor was an artist, but was primarily engaged in a kind of psychotherapy).
That's just some of my musings on possibilities, take that with a salt-mine of salt ;). There's probably more accurate takes on it, and no doubt Jungian scholars, like the brilliant Sonu Shamdasani and other post-Jungians have a more informed point of view (so looking into their writing about it is probably the way to go to gain a clearer vision on this matter).
I've just become aware of a book that Dr Susan Rowland has written called C.G. Jung in the Humanities: Taking the Soul's Path. Perhaps some of the concerns linked to your question are discussed in there?
There was also recently a post and thread that some of the community contributed other takes on regarding how Jung is situated in psychology or among the psychotherapies here. There's some good moments of insight in that content even if it does wander a bit into other thickets..
OP; thanks for sharing this post, a good spot. Apologies if my own comments here have diverted into other regions of concern..
I know this is probably random, but you look like you might be interested in this book if you haven't already read it: https://www.amazon.com/Divided-Self-Existential-Madness-Classics-ebook/dp/B00341852W/ . It changed my outlook on Schizophrenia and I completeley agree with your statement about eccentricity. It's very interesting reading from an existential point of view about case studies of schizophrenics from a therapist who tried different approach and has seen very interesting common problems in families of the patients.
Ok I found the source for this before, and I remember that they are wearing underwear, and its not on e621.
the kid is here though
Can you use amazon rentals where you are? You can get it for $10, seems pretty reasonable. Amazon Link
Same guy? https://www.amazon.com/Mastering-Solution-Focused-Counseling-Jeffrey-Guterman/dp/1556202679
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solution_focused_brief_therapy
Its Breo
https://www.amazon.com/Worth-Dying-Robert-Dennis-Eliot/dp/B000E7RABG
Shaynoodle is damn sexy. ;]
I took a lot of psych classes. My exes major was also psych so I helped him study a lot. I actually really like ready psych textbooks, and my favorite part of psych was abnormal psychology. Forensic psychology is fascinating too.
Abnormal Psychology book with a really pretty color and high rating.
Case Studies in Abnormal Psych
annnnd last but not least, to help your decision.
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The connection between BF behavior and autism has been explored by Chris Noel (part 1, part 2, as well as in book form). It's a really sharp idea imo, but there's a lot more to it than them being "not right in the head." Willing to get into it if you want, but give the videos a quick glance at least and familiarize yourself with the theory first.
I like this or this and this
bushiz wrote:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Masculine-Self-THIRD-EDITION/dp/1597380059/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_2
is the big book of men's studies from a feminist perspective written by a dude
Just struggle through it. Man and his Symbols is already a dumbed down summary of Jungian psychology. Introducing Jung: A Graphic Guide is sort of a manga introduction to Jung.
Personally I don't think I would be so sympathetic to Jung's ideas if I were not a visionary by nature myself. Jung is best understood by somebody who is confronted by the psyche and is struggling to understand the deepest aspects of himself. Without such access to the psyche, innate spirituality, you are going to be a skeptic.
>The term gender identity disorder is an older term for the condition in the DSM. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) uses the term gender dysphoria.[43] The APA's DSM first described the condition in the third publication ("DSM-III") in 1980.[44]
Gender Identity Disorder and Gender Dysphoria are literally the same thing, and first appeared in the DSM-III in 1980.
> gender didn't exist at the time.
Now you're just making shit up.
>Got some examples or are you just going to keep talking out of your ass?
Sure, that's a single meta analysis of gender science research that cites over 400 studies done on the subject. Or just go buy the DSM-III if you don't believe me.
Are you in the Toronto area?
I didn't count how many books there are... 2 or 3 dozen maybe? If you want them, it's kind of an all or nothing deal. Most of them are bundled together with twine in small stacks. I'm not going to undo them.
Here are a few examples based on whatever book was on the top of some of the stacks. You'll notice none of these are particularly recent.
Ok, so you said that "there are no objects that exist and events that occur in the world outside the mind" and then proceeded to tell me believing otherwise is just an assumption. How is that different from what I did? I actually gave a substantial starting point from where we can continue.
"Just as humans are born with a characteristic anatomical structure that differentiates our species from other animal creatures, so also do we enter embodied life with a psychical organization that predetermines the general form in which our consciousness may develop, irrespective of the extent to which the specific form of that consciousness may be conditioned by environmental factors"
This highlights an important point I want to make about the nature of the mind and objective reality. Like #1 says above, we come limited and predisposed to think and talk about reality through "conceptual schemes and the limits of our language" which is limited by the function and capacity of our evolutionary hand-me-down the cerebral cortex. I only admit that our understanding of the outside world is hampered by these limitations and therefore the discussion must then be directed towards the question of, as with #2, "how much of the apparent intelligibility of the world is a contribution of the mind and how much the world itself contributes to that seeming intelligibility".
So what you are trying to debate is this: When we look at an object in nature, is our knowledge about that object the object inside the mind or the object outside the mind. You say the dichotomy between inside and outside is an illusion and therefore we are only ever thinking of objects "inside the mind". Many problems arise with this line of thinking. Joseph Margolis summarizes the skeptics (your) position...
"So that if, in coming to know the independent world we must always rely on “ideas” in the mind, which cannot in principle claim direct access to the world said to be known, we cannot confirm that those ideas ever correspond to the way the world actually is. This is the insuperable formula of modern skepticism."
"These two themes—(a) the principled disjunction between the resources of knowledge and the “corresponding” properties of the independent world and (b) the restriction of our cognitive resources to an entirely interior “representational” function (a tertium)—are the chief sources of an intolerable skepticism that runs through much of modern philosophy"
But there is a solution to our modern infatuation with skepticism...
"The resolution of modern skepticism requires two distinct steps. Speaking loosely, we may say the first was taken by Kant and the second by Hegel. Kant argues (in the Critique of Pure Reason) that the cognizable structure of the objective world is itself constituted—originally structured—in accord with the prior constituting powers of experience, the so-called pure intuitions of time and space, and the categories of the understanding: in effect, the intelligible (all the intelligible) structures of reality that the mind is capable of comprehending."
This harkens back to the first quote about being "born with a characteristic anatomical structure".
"It was, however, Hegel’s supreme contribution to have grasped the fact that skepticism could never be put to rest without taking a step beyond the puzzles of representationality and correspondence (call that symbiosis)."
"...there remains one unshakable discovery: namely, that the accumulating history of what counts
as knowledge (and our cognizing competence) is the essential condition of the continuing evolution of knowledge itself (and of our cognizing competence); furthermore, that same process must be understood as gathering up the aggregated experience of individual human subjects as well as the collective ethos of the historical society within whose terms such individuals function in the apt (but limited) way they do. All that is part and parcel of the “experience” imputed to Hegel’s invented subject, Geist."
"...the import of representationalism (the first of the two skeptical puzzles mentioned) cannot be decisively resolved except by resolving the second (correspondentism: the puzzle of the relationship between appearance and reality)."
"...the language of Geist brings together (a) the subjective side of the run of pre-Kantian/Kantian thought, (b) the objective side of what is “other” than that,the “world,” which all hands wish to preserve, and (c) the union of (a) and (b) as internal to a putatively inclusive being (“Absolute Geist”) which is the logical “space,” so to say, in which the historical unfolding of human knowledge obtains, cast (metaphorically) as the creative process of Geist’s“self”-knowledge... the improvement over Kant stands: the relocation of epistemic legitimation in the collective processes of historical life. "
"The truth is, there is no way to prioritize metaphysics over epistemology or epistemology over metaphysics. Whatever we say is true of reality rests on whatever we suppose we can validly claim, and whatever we claim (in terms of our subjective or cognitional powers) we suppose holds true in virtue of the way the world is." - Joseph Margolis