Best military strategy history books according to redditors
We found 580 Reddit comments discussing the best military strategy history books. We ranked the 218 resulting products by number of redditors who mentioned them. Here are the top 20.
We found 580 Reddit comments discussing the best military strategy history books. We ranked the 218 resulting products by number of redditors who mentioned them. Here are the top 20.
Heya. Sorry to hijack the top comment, but I'm coming into the tread late and I suspect this comment will just get buried.
I was a producer for four years at Ubisoft between 2003 and 2007, and I worked exclusively on Tom Clancy games. I definitely feel today the the Clancy games are jingoistic, though it took me a long time to realize it.
Right off the bat, I want to say it's not a conscious decision. The teams I interacted with in four different Ubisoft studios were incredibly diverse in terms of nationalities and backgrounds, so I think overall, for the production teams, American realpolitik was a bit of a fantasy world without much consequence in the real world. I certainly didn't give it much thought back then.
But then, I remember distinctly... I was at an E3 where Ghost Recon 2 was being shown, and amazingly enough, some North Koreans learned that they were the enemies in that game and reacted strongly through official DPRK papers. I initially found this hilarious, but it got me thinking how it must feel to be one of those enemies in a Clancy game. And little by little I grew uncomfortable with my involvement in those games.
That uneasiness grew when, around 2007, Ubisoft became the publisher on consoles for America's Army. I mean, it's one thing to make a war game fantasy a la Ghost Recon Advanced Warfighter, but to actually publish a game built as a recruitment tool for the U.S. Army? It was a lot to swallow coming from a French company.
I worked close to writers on many of these games and we always tried to infuse some sense of morality, some actual thought about the cost of war and the ethical implications of it. But when your canvas is a team of badass American soldiers going into enemy territory to take out a cartoony villain, there's just so much wiggle room. I think the most successful series to do this was Splinter Cell, because Fisher was always caught in the consequences of his actions up close.
(Slight disgression here: yes, Ironside helped shape the character through his performance, but he had little if no influence in shaping the character besides suggesting some line rewrites in the sound booth. Him talking about defining Fisher is just playing off for the camera.)
Anyway, to come back to modern-day Clancy jingoism: I think what you're seeing is just developers playing to what they think the audience wants. They get inspired by Hollywood and other games, not the least, I suspect, being the CoD franchise. Based on my personal experience I don't think it's 1) a new thing at all, nor 2) a premeditated thing beyond wanting to give the fans what they think they want.
I'm glad I'm not on these games all the same, because I realize that, as innocent as the intent is, they feed into a collective, multimedia fantasy about the meaning and impact of military intervention abroad. And the older I get, the less comfortable I am with that.
A few years ago I read War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning by Chris Hedges and that shook me to my core as it made me realize the deep impact of war, what the experience truly is, and how we play it off for fun and patriotism in a way that's almost perverse. I'll admit I'm still involved in games that portray violence or fantasy war, but I'm glad I'm no longer feeding the perception of war in the present or near-future.
I haven't read this book but it makes the argument that no more than 1 in 4 soldiers actually fired their weapons at the enemy during world war II. https://www.amazon.com/Men-Against-Fire-Problem-Command/dp/0806132809
I would credit the victory over France more to his generals, especially Guderian. The German doctrine at the time allowed for significant leeway on the part of field commanders and many of them showed incredible aggressiveness that led to that victory. Hitler and much of his staff at the time did not want the Panzer divisions to keep pressing into France, they feared that the lines would become too vulnerable and France would be able to counterattack. The Panzer divisions were actually ordered to stop, but Guderian pretended there was a problem with the radio and claimed he didn't receive the order. Then, he requested permission to send an "armed recon" mission to scout ahead -- and then he sent his whole division forward, claiming they were all part of the "recon" team. Eventually, Hitler asserted a halt order that is still a little controversial among military historians, and it caused the German advance to stop long enough for the Dunkirk evacuation. Had Hitler not given this order, Dunkirk may not have happened.
Sources for all this: http://www.amazon.com/The-Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign/dp/1591142954/ and http://www.amazon.com/Quest-Decisive-Victory-Stalemate-Blitzkrieg/dp/0700616551/
Overall, the German army seemed to struggle most with intelligence (not meaning they were dumb, I mean in terms of getting information on the enemy, and counter-intelligence = keeping the enemy from finding out about you). They didn't seem to have great intel, and the allies often had solid intel on German movements, which plagued a lot of the German operations.
It seems that over the course of the war, Hitler went from an open policy, allowing his field commanders to improvise at their discretion, which tended to work well and give them flexibility -- to a more micro-managing, hands-on approach as the war went on. This kept the army from being able to respond as quickly and effectively.
And the Russians had spies at high levels in both the British government and military, but didn't truth their reports because the Kremlin assumed the spies were double agents. Interesting book called Double Cross tells all about it.
> Again and again, he has urged the reader to bask in awesome feel-good moments of warmongering, such as Robb’s “King in the North” crowning, Dany’s “Dracarys” in Astapor, and Doran’s “Fire and Blood” speech to Arianne…
I like this a lot, because IMO there is something innate within humanity which loves conflict. We feel a mini adrenaline rush at those scenes, because it's a mini version of what war is like. As Chris Hedges wrote in fantastic book War is a Force Which Gives Us Meaning
> The rush of battle is often a potent and lethal addiction, for war is a drug.
In actual combat, this magnified many, many times over, but reading (and seeing) the Dracarys scene gave me a familiar "Fuck yeah!" feeling at watching people buy it. And sure, they were reprehensible, but I mean we are reading/watching people burn to death. Even your quote to end this blog post gave me this feeling.
> The dragons are now unchained, and the gloves are off.
Anyways, fantastic post, great series, looking forward to the next part. Cheers
You guys should read this book by Ian Easton
https://www.amazon.com/Chinese-Invasion-Threat-American-Strategy/dp/1546353259
War isn't going to happen in 2020. I'd be surprised if it would happen at all. The most interesting point he brings up in his book involves geography and the weather: there's about a six week window throughout the year where it's calm enough across the strait to launch an invasion of scale. That's not enough time to move 100,000+ troops.
That being said, Taiwan really needs to take its own defense seriously. Time to crack down on draft dodging.
I don't know myself but I can refer you to r/redpreppers and r/privacytoolsIO. Maybe read up about Guerilla tactics and Urban guerrilla warfare. Definitely read up about counter insurgency and COINTELPRO, you have to know your enemies' tactics and get yourself to keep a steady plan and date, discipline is key. Great to hear Americans are preparing, it seems more and more necessary with every passing day!
Great book on the topic if you haven't already read it: Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies.
That's all right, no doubt, 'but':
> This meant that yet again the German Armored forces where exposed to counter attacks. And indeed the French did attempt more counter-attacks, however, they where unorganized - and French Armour was not consolidated into large formations rather instead they where distributed in several smaller formations and distributed along the front lines.
Well, I find the expression 'unorganized' for 'misleading'. The French were rather 'over-organized'. The actual problem was that the French command and control structure, and pace of operations, were 'custom-tailored' to the pace of operations from WWI. Thus, they simply couldn't keep up with developments of May 1940.
Countless units were ordered into counterattacks, but usually didn't receive their orders on time, and couldn't reach designated starting points on time - because their headquarters were far too far in the rear, and because they lacked even telephone connections (not to talk about most of army-level headquarters not even having a single radio). Result was that by the time the orders would reach commanders in the field, the situation usually experienced a fundamental change: say, the Germans either forced the unit to withdraw, or passed by its flank. Furthermore, French commanders didn't trust themselves to act on their own (nor were actually granted permission to do so - and that by their very own field regulations).
In most of cases, the result was that the counterattacks were cancelled even before they were launched - and majority of units ordered to stabilise a frontline and build-up a defensive frontline, 'instead'. Or to withdraw.
The few counter-attacks that were actually launched were run haphazardly and generally insufficient. Amid growing chaos there were actually just three attempts of counterattacks at 'operational level'. Except for Arras, these were those at Stone (this village south of Sedan changed hands some 17 - or more - times between 13 and 20 May), and then de Gaule's attempt to reach Montcornet (spelling?) - which was destroyed by Luftwaffe's Stukas, although highly promising, and - at least early on - quite effective, too. Even most of these have not really 'worked', because of poor, slow command and control.
> These tenets for Combined Mobile & Armored Warfare would be put into place in the Blitz of Poland...
There was no 'Blitzkrieg'-style of thinking during the Poland campaign: that one was still fought along decades-old theories of 'Kesselschlacht'.
Recommended read (actually a 'must read' to this topic): Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg-Legend.
Here what I've picked up
On War by Clausewitz
MCDP 1 Warfighting
FMFRP 12-18 Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare
FMFRP 12-13 Maneuver in War
On Grand Strategy
The Art of War by Baron De Jomini
Just and Unjust Wars (apparently it's on the Commandant's reading list too)
Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle
Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla
Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare
Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat
Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations (Volume 5)
JP-1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
DoD Law of War Manual
The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics
Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns
The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam
Strategy: A History
LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World
MCTP 3-01C Machine Guns and Machine Gun Gunnery
Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011
Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State
Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime
This is all I can name off the top of my head right now
> but there's several reasons why a militia would win over a large-scale state army.
I too have read a good deal on the subject of guerrilla warfare and I honestly feel this is playing down how difficult it is for the militia. It takes massive political support, something anarchism does not have right now, and an incredibly skilled leadership, which anarchism is also lacking. Also the opposition needs networks to communicate and spread propaganda and literature amongst the people. There has to be multiple channels being used simultaneously such as the internet, paper(s), etc. Unfortunately the internet won't be of much use if there is no power or supplies to repair the technology needed to access it and industrial printing presses are not only few and far between, but are also bourgeois/government owned. This isn't even taking into account the sheer amount of manpower and weaponry that is needed. The former of which anarchism lacks and the latter of which Americans do have in number, but not strength. The days of attacking enemy convoys and simply taking their weaponry is long pasted with the advent of modern technology and increasingly advanced counter insurgency tactics. That being said it is possible and I'd argue somewhat common for an insurgency to win a war, but it is far from as simple as your post makes it out to be and is most definitely not a sure thing. It also usually has an idea that everyone, read people other than simply anarchist, can really get behind, support, and even die for.
The main factor I left out is the use of land, which I suppose could be lumped under the skilled leadership criteria stated above. This issue is an extremely important one as the terrain used and knowing how to use said terrain has been known as the great equalizer of men. It makes irregular forces and regular forces equals when they otherwise wouldn't be. If anyone has any questions please send me a PM.
Also I suppose since I asked for the other users who posted on the subject of guerrilla warfare to post their sources I should include my main sources. These are the main and best ones I've read but there are many others.
Partisan Warfare by O Heilbrunn
Insurgency and Terrorism:From Revolution to Apocalypse by Bard E. O'Neill
War of the Flea:The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare by Robert Taber
On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-Tung. You can find this for free here.
Guerrilla Warfare by Che Guevara. You can find a part of this for free here.
>So you're right, this is something a lot more anarchists should consider.
Everyone of every ideology should. You never know when you will need to fight an organized army. Be it an invading one or your own.
Also if you don't mind me asking what books have you read on the subject? I'm looking for some new ones.
Edits: *
>What is it with these types and war metaphors?
War Is A Force That Gives Them Meaning
It is also an excellent book by Ben Macintyre called Double Cross. I would recommend Macintyre's books to anyone who wants to read about espionage. They are all fascinating.
I was afraid this would happen. You essentially read exactly what you wanted to see in my post.
> Just because you didn't freak out or cry when you saw the World Trade Center collapse doesn't make you "all kinds of fucked up"
Where did I ever suggest that? You took something I said all the way at the bottom of my post, completely unrelated to my reaction as a teenager to the WTC, and tried to jiujitsu those things together.
To clarify, I said that if you were playing truly disturbing videogames at a young age, ones that place you in the roles of a genocidal death camp guard or a serial rapist, then you would be "all kinds of fucked up". That doesn't take a PhD from Harvard to figure out.
> Have you been desensitized to seeing violence happening on a screen? Apparently so. I can't say I or any of my gamer friends have had the same experience, but that's anecdotal evidence for you.
It's pretty much proven that Generation X and Y are far more desensitized to violence than previous generations because of media. That's just proof.
> Even if it's true, does it really matter? That doesn't make you any more likely to commit violence in real life, and I'm sure you'd still have a strong emotional reaction if you were actually involved with or witness to a real, in-person violent situation.
Yes, it does, because it cultivates a great potential to kill.
I recommend you to read On Killing by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, a former psychology professor at West Point. West Point. You know, the military academy that trains future US Army officers. He's kind of an authority on what it takes to prepare soldiers to kill human targets.
His research compiled some very interesting facts. For example, Samuel Marshall, a Brigadier General and World War I vet, noticed that there was a big ratio disparity between rounds fired and rounds hit among servicemen in World War II. Few soldiers were even actively aiming at their targets.
To amend this, several training changes were made. The US Army replaced their bullseye targets with ones shaped like human silhouettes. Instead of firing at static targets, the focus was shifted to pop-up targets, forcing soldiers to react and fire rapidly. They didn't have the luxury to think about the action they were able to carry out.
The soldiers who graduated from this adjusted program and went into the Korean War had far higher kill ratios. Not because they were better trained, but because they were desensitized.
Videogames don't make you a killer but it gives you far greater potential to be one. I'm not foolish enough to think I've been immune to those effects and anyone who disagrees is laughing in the face of 70 years of proven military research.
You typed an emotional, reactionary reply where you assumed that I'm saying video games are bad. I'm not. Dude, you are talking to a guy who used to work for Major League Gaming. I probably put more hours into violent games than anyone else in this thread, but that doesn't mean I'm going to act like some threatened child whenever a serious psychological study comes up linking games and violence. I absolutely do believe there is a correlation. No doubt about it. Violence is a powerful tool to tell great stories but, like anything else, you get used to it over time. The first time you see naked women at a nude beach may be a big deal, but by the 50th time, they just becomes part of the background.
There's obviously a big difference between killing something in a game and killing in real life but even the simulation of it already prepares an individual to an extent. Basic Training is a far cry from actual warfare, but it prepares you.
By the way, if you read Grossman's book, you will see that he also agrees with us in saying that violence is not a bad thing in and of itself. On the contrary, it's actually a vital trait required in true self-defense. If there is a clear threat or danger to yourself or your loved ones, there's no way to guarantee that safety unless you're willing to kill to preserve those lives. What he's saying is that it's foolish to believe that violence is cultivated in a bubble. You can't tell me religious beliefs, political beliefs, or whatever lead to violence and then turn around and claim that suddenly certain mediums are just incapable of affecting the subconscious, especially a medium that features killing as a staple.
I agree on all points except the efficiency of the soviet system. Collectivization may be bad for peacetime economies but it worked minor miracles for the Soviets during the war. In 1943 the Soviet Union produced half as much steel as Germany and used it to make literally twice the number of tanks. For all their technological sophistication the germans never mastered mass production.
[source]
It's actually a quote from "Rules for Radicals". It's a must read for just about any politician worth his or her salt. It's basically a political warfare manual. Read that, "The Prince", "On War" and "The art of war" and you will have a pretty good understanding of what they are actually doing up there. There are several other books I'd recommend if you really want an understanding, but those are a good start.
I also really enjoyed Double Cross. It has a good mix of first hand accounts pieced together from Allied records and some images from the program.
As with all of the WWII books I've read, it tends to overstate the importance of the unit in question (turned spies and the spy program in this case), but it really interesting as a whole.
Edit: Maybe overstate is the wrong word, but I've found that books and accounts from participants from WWII tend to state that the effort portrayed turned the tides. It's not that any of these books (Band of Brothers, Double Cross, Beyond The Call, others) are wrong, it's just that there were so many effective pieces in motion that it seems wrong to give weight to any one of them over the others.
I guess certain anthropologists want to 'give back' to the communities they study, and obviously that'll take place in a charity kind of way on a capitalist basis. That isn't very specific to anthropology though, and you can find tons of critiques of NGOs on the internet.
A more interesting critique of anthropology is how it arose from the colonial encounter in order to better rule colonial subjects, justify their inferiority, and so on. A decent Marxist book on this is J. Fabian's Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, but it has been acknowledged by liberal mainstream anthropologists for a long time.
The US military uses something called "Human Terrain Systems" in which they basically employ anthropologists to help them with imperialism. There's a fairly recent book on this titled Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in the Service of the Militarized State. From what I know it's written from a left-liberal perspective, but it obviously can be really easily linked to a scientific Marxist analysis of imperialism.
Anyway, there's much more to anthropology than it being a weapon of imperialism. Marx & Engels were extremely keen on anthropology and its discoveries' connection to their politics. They wrote loads about it, most famously in Engels's The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, which is actually based on Marx's Ethnological Notebooks. Anthropology continued to play a pretty important role in Marxism, including Lenin encouraging ethnographic studies in order to better administer the USSR.
> How's a shill supposed to learn to overthrow our democratic processes?
With this book, actually.
In addition to many of the other books that others have listed (namely Kissinger and Mearsheimer) I have listed a few other books that I would highly recommend reading.
And because you are interested in learning more about the Middle East, be prepared to read. A lot. The Middle East is a far more complex place than most people imagine and understanding the region requires a great deal of knowledge. I have been studying the Middle East for nearly a decade and I still feel like there is so much that I do not know. I would start by reading reputable news sources every day. Places like The Economist, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, BBC, Financial Times, are the Los Angeles Times are good English language news sources that you should look at. Additionally, I have written up a suggested reading list for learning about the Middle East, though it is a bit more security-related since that's my area of expertise. I hope it helps. And feel free to ask any questions if you have them.
Books - International Relations, Theory and Beyond
Books - General History of the Middle East
Books - Middle East Military History
Books - Middle East Terrorism and Substate Violence
Books - U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East
A rebuttal in support of Hitler was a Christian, was anti-Catholic (or had significant issues with the Vatican - even though the Vatican and Pope gave tacit support to the Nazis), and that Hitler's Table Talk (the source of most of the "Hitler was not a Christian") is a flawed source (unless the original German edition (in German) is used).
{from previous post re: Hitler and his strong Christian moral and belief
foundation}
Nazism, based upon and supported by Christian morals and tenets, and
lead by and staffed by True Christians^TM , is responsible for the
largest (by death toll) genocide in modern history. Perhaps you have
hear of this genocide? The Holocaust (Lower figures (5-6 million) are
for the Jewish genocide, and the higher figures (11-17 million) is for
the total killed in all Nazi genocides and War Crimes.)
Adolf Hitler was a God fearing Christian and promoted, and advocated
for, Christianity; Hitler was a really good Christian.
The evidence is credible and overwhelming that Hitler was (1) a
Christian, (2) held Christian values (as Hitler saw them), (3) was
informed of his morality that he put into policy from Christian
doctrine/dogma/morality, and (4) all indications were that that if
Hitler had created the fascist empire he worked towards, this empire
would have continued to use Christianity as a means (one of many) to
maintain control over the populace.
Adolf Hitler labelled himself as a Christian and promoted, and advocated
for, Christianity in the Nazi ideology; and used violence and genocide
to promote Christianity for the sake of Christianity as part of the Nazi
Party regime.
In Hitler's own words....
“My feelings as a Christian points me to my Lord and Savior as a
fighter. It points me to the man who once in loneliness, surrounded
by a few followers, recognized these Jews for what they were and
summoned men to fight against them and who, God’s truth! was greatest
not as a sufferer but as a fighter. In boundless love as a Christian
and as a man I read through the passage which tells us how the Lord
at last rose in His might and seized the scourge to drive out of the
Temple the brood of vipers and adders. How terrific was his fight
against the Jewish poison. Today, after two thousand years, with
deepest emotion I recognize more profoundly than ever before the fact
that it was for this that He had to shed his blood upon the Cross. As
a Christian I have no duty to allow myself to be cheated, but I have
the duty to be a fighter for truth and justice… And if there is
anything which could demonstrate that we are acting rightly, it is
the distress that daily grows. For as a Christian I have also a duty
to my own people. And when I look on my people I see them work and
work and toil and labor, and at the end of the week they have only
for their wages wretchedness and misery. When I go out in the morning
and see these men standing in their queues and look into their
pinched faces, then I believe I would be no Christian, but a very
devil, if I felt no pity for them, if I did not, as did our Lord two
thousand years ago, turn against those by whom today this poor people
are plundered and exposed.”
Adolf Hitler, speech in Munich on April 12, 1922, countering a
political opponent, Count Lerchenfeld, who opposed antisemitism on
his personal Christian feelings. Published in "My New Order", quoted
in Freethought Today April 1990
“I believe today that my conduct is in accordance with the will of the
Almighty Creator.”
Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 46
And let's not forget Hitler's book, Mein Kampf - My Struggle:
Unabridged edition of Hitlers original book - Four and a Half Years of
Struggle against Lies, Stupidity, and
Cowardice,
where the morality was informed and supported by Hitler's Christian
beliefs and canon Christian morality.
And, and try to stay with me here OP, I have actually researched the
assessment of historians that have claimed that Hitler was an atheist
(irreligious and an opponent of Christianity) and find their evidence
and arguments lacking and often based heavily, and often primarily, upon
a series notes from private talks between Hitler and others (Hitler,
Adolf. Hitler's Table Talk: His Private Conversations, 1941-1944.
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953) which depicted Hitler as an
anti-Christian atheist, but where the sources usually referenced were
actually translated from a French version and not the original German;
and that the French translation radically altered the original meaning
of the German (Carrier, R.C., 2003. "Hitler's Table Talk": Troubling
Finds. German Studies Review, 26(3), pp.561-576). In the 3rd edition of
Table Talks, the faulty translations are acknowledged in the Forward
(but, oddly, without any correction of the translations in the
subsequent text).
While it can be concluded that Hitler became anti-Catholic (or more
specifically, anti-Pope and anti-HolySee/Vatican) and criticized many
aspects of Catholic, and other Christian sect, tenets, as well as
questioning many of the supernatural Christian claims - this criticism,
in and of itself, especially against the very wide variance of Christian
tenets and beliefs, as well as the expressed public affirmation of
Christian belief, tenets, traditions, and morality, by Hitler, at best,
allows one to conclude that Hitler was not a "mainstream" Christian.
But to posit that Hitler was atheist/irreligious and a not a Christian
requires a better argument to avoid the No True Scotsman fallacy.
Bottom line - Hitler's Table Talk: 1941 - 1944, by H.R. Trevor-Roper, is
a questionable source (and shown to be fraudulent at least in part),
and the quoted material requires verification from another source.
Edit:
As to Richard Overy's work as a source in support of 'Hitler is not a Christian,' In Overy's book,
Why the Allies Won, Overy references Hitler: Table Talks from editor Hugh Trevor-Roper. Which is the English translation of the French (flawed) version of Table Talks (and not a direct English translation of the original German edition. As this source to Overy has been shown to be flawed (a flawed and misleading translation), Overy as a source to the Christian beliefs of Hitler is suspect, and the argument from authority highly questionable.
Edit 2:
Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War. A search of my copy of Evan's book, The Third Reich at War also reveals that Evan used "Trevor-Roper, Hugh R., The Last Days of Hitler (London, 1962 [1947]). ——, ‘The Mind of Adolf Hitler’, in Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talk vii-xxxv." Which has the same flawed information as used by Overy. And like Overy, using Evans as a source to the Christian beliefs of Hitler is suspect, and the argument from authority highly questionable.
As to Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, I do not have a copy nor the time (currently) to track the text down - so no direct rebuttal.
This, I presume? Link for the curious. I will have to find a copy.
In depends. The military identifies three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical is just as it sounds. Small units up to Brigade and Division level. Operational goes higher, division to corps, to Joint Task Force to Theater. Strategic goes from theater to national. The lines can blur, especially between operational and strategic.
In the Army, company grade officers (LTs and CPTs) focus on the tactical level in their training. Theoretically, all junior officers learn some degree of small unit tactics. Some company grade officer end up working at higher levels so they get a lot of OJT at the higher levels. That's what happened to me when I was a Captain assigned to CENTCOM.
Field grades (MAJ-COL) get trained at the operational and strategic level. These are the folks who write all the plans. They are also the ones who command battalions and above.
At the Colonel level, officers get training on the higher echelons of strategy or what some people might call "grand strategy". These are the guys who will write the big war plans.
There are schools at each level that teach officers how to do their jobs. Many officers also attend graduate school. That's where I'm at right now. (http://www.nps.edu/Academics/SIGS/NSA/)
As far as reading goes, it depends on what you're interested in. For tactical, books like "Band of Brothers" are timeless and great. "Thunder Run" is a good look at the early phases of OIF. For a look at the Operational/Strategic level, I'd check out "Cobra II", "Fiasco", and "The Gamble".
Most of the military publications and field manuals are open source. The Ranger Handbook is the best all around for small unit tactics. If you want to learn how the Army is set up, try FM-1 The Army (http://www.army.mil/fm1/) or the COIN manual. (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf) For a look at how all the forces fight together, check out the Joint Operations Manual. (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf) However, most of these are really dry and jargon laden.
If you want a good starting source for strategy and what has shaped strategic thought, check out "Makers of Modern Strategy". (http://www.amazon.com/Makers-Modern-Strategy-Machiavelli-Nuclear/dp/0691027641) You can also read up on some Clausewitz because we love our dead German military theorists in the Army.
Liddel Hart's Strategy. Its used at west point in military history classes. Hart is an uninspiring historian but a brilliant strategist.
SAS Survival Handbook
US Army Survival Manual: FM 21-76
UST Learn & Live Outdoor Skills
To add to what Ryan said, there are also a bunch of good books on the subject, most of which can be found for free.
John 'Lofty' Wiseman's SAS Survival Handbook is extremely comprehensive (around 600 pages) and very information-dense.
The US Army Survival Manual is also pretty good, but it's not as comprehensive or detailed as Wiseman's book.
Although it's more of a bushcraft book, Mors Kochanski's Bushcraft is extremely well done. His descriptions are easy to read, but fairly comprehensive, and are paired with detailed sketches and pictures.
Mainly, just go out and practice. You're already a capable outdoorsman, so it shouldn't be too much of a hassle. If you wanna take courses, just search around for courses near where you are, or maybe look at something like NOLS. Hope that's helpful.
I highly, highly recommend Hedges' book "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning."
http://www.amazon.com/War-Force-that-Gives-Meaning/dp/1400034639
"The composition and leadership of the insurgents were changing. As the FREs (Former Regime Elements) weakened, (Col. Brian) Drinkwine received warnings that foreign fighters were infiltrating into the Jolan, including the arch-terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi...On a night raid two Egyptians were arrested in an apartment with slogans supporting bin Laden scrawled in sheep's blood on a wall. Neighbors told a reporter that foreign fighters were threatening people who played Western music, styled their hair, wore revealing clothes, or even sold wood to contractors for the Americans."
"We heard the Islamic fundamentalists were starting to taunt Saddam's guys, saying the old army guys didn't have the balls to take on the Americans...We saw a change in tactics."
"The Iraqis never tired of talking, issuing long litanies of complains, making passionate promises of stability, and stoutly denying the presence of foreign fighters. The Fallujans were good people, fighting to protect their city. If the Americans would stop firing and pull out, all would be well. It was never clear, though, who spoke for the fighters. Those with the power of the guns remained shadowy figures, never mentioned by name."
"During the third week of April...Bremer's experienced deputy...chaired four sessions...to resolve the siege... Every day rusted and broken weapons were turned in as symbols of progress while the violence continued. As for expelling the terrorists, the negotiators denied they existed. Foreign fighters, they said, were a myth and an excuse to punish the city."
"(American LtCol Byrne asked) 'Can we agree that we share the same goals? That we both want the heavy weapons and the foreign fighters removed from the city, do we not?' (Former regime LCol. responded:) 'That is an American story. There are no foreign fighters...we take care of security by ourselves. If you are not here, there is no problem.'"
"(Muhhamad Latif, a colonel in the intelligence branch who had been imprisoned for seven years by Saddam) and the city elders met with Mattis, explaining that the people of Fallujah wanted no help from outsiders...Latif denied there were any foreign fighters in the city"
"Foreign fighters from Syria and Saudi Arabia trickled into the city. The insurgents organized a ruling council, called the Mujahadeen Shura, which moved into a mosque in the center of the city and issued written passes for Arab journalists to visit the 'liberated' city...The reign of the Taliban had descended on Fallujah."
"Neither the American nor the Arab press called particular attention to the proliferation of terrorist safe houses in Fallujah, while the city elders vehemently denied Zarqawi existed."
"'For the sake of your city,' Mattis said, 'you must tell Zarqawi and the Syrians to leave. They are killing your innocent fellow countrymen.... Get them out.'" (Chief negotiator Imam Abdullah Janabi replies) 'Someone gives you bad information... there are no foreigners here. You bomb innocent people. We only protect our homes when you come to destroy.'"
-- No True Glory - A Frontline Account of the Battle of Fallujah
Recommended reading: The war of the Flea
> I'd like to think I'd at least kill the nazi on the stairs.
[The odds aren't in your favor.] (https://www.amazon.com/Men-Against-Fire-Problem-Command/dp/0806132809) Roughly three out of every four GI's never fired their weapons during the war, "even though they were engaged in combat and under direct threat".
You can pick some tactic and call it blitzkrieg, but it was not what others call blitzkrieg. In the end it was just just normal German maneuver warfare.
German generals had the same opinion and modern historians agree with that.
The best and definitive source on the issue is Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West
"Blitzkrieg" was never planned as a blitzkrieg. The “miracle of 1940” was a result of three factors;
Because a lot of people out there literally believe the dumbest shit.
Dems need to approach the GOP base with classical counterinsurgency tactics, minus the direct action components, treating them like you would any other extreme fundamentalist sect. Education, hearts and minds.
My favorite
It makes the least assumptions of the kendo books I've read. However you may find you won't get a lot out of books until you're further along in your kendo career, especially if you don't speak japanese. So many terms to learn and things you can't really process just yet. I bought a bunch of books early on and it wasn't until a couple years in that lots of it really started making sense.
> S.L.A. "Slam" Marshall was a veteran of World War I and a combat historian during World War II. He startled the military and civilian world in 1947 by announcing that, in an average infantry company, no more than one in four soldiers actually fired their weapons while in contact with the enemy. His contention was based on interviews he conducted immediately after combat in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II.
https://www.amazon.com/Men-Against-Fire-Problem-Command/dp/0806132809
War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare https://www.amazon.com/dp/1574885553/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_api_Dk79ybZ3RMB0S
I'm gunna buy it. I need other book suggestions to make it $25 for free shipping.
Here are some of my suggestions to others:
>The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Paperback)
>by John A. Nagl
>http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0226841510
>Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Paperback)
>by John A. Nagl
>http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0226567702
>War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier (Paperback)
>by Smedley D. Butler
>http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0922915865
>Cultivating Exceptional Cannabis: An Expert Breeder Shares His Secrets (Marijuana Tips Series) (Paperback)
>by DJ Short
>http://www.amazon.com/Cultivating-Exceptional-Cannabis-Breeder-Marijuana/dp/0932551599
Chris Hedges actually wrote a book about his experience in war zones, how some of his fellow journalists literally becoming addicted to the action. The books called War Is a force that gives us meaning. He called it a drug, a very potent one in fact. I'm simply borrowing the phrase as I've never seen combat myself. But it's not exactly a controversial view or anything.
There seems to be two types of people who goto war, those, like Smedley Butler who see war for what it is, largely an unglamorous and unvirtuous means for men in power to dominate the resources of those without it. And there is this dude, who buys into the myth his fathers and grandfathers have drummed into his head, that War is Glorious. That it makes you a Man. etc.
So layman can be a relative term... non-degreed but well-read amatuer all the way down to "never read anything related to this topic before", so with that in mind, "Makers of Modern Strategy" is a pretty excellent place to start, collecting essays from a number of notable experts and covering the evolution of military strategy over the past ~500 or so years.
Just wanted to add I'm turning 44 this week and just started kendo in October of last year. So I sure hope you aren't too old!
Honestly you are super young man. While there will be youth that are starting as well, you're at the age where you have some maturity and can probably apply yourself with more focus. The sensei that ran the seminar I just went to over the weekend is 70 years old and still going. So just imagine you have over 50 years of kendo ahead of you.
A couple of resources I found that are really helpful:
http://suffolkkendo.co.uk/KendoTrainingHandbook(rev5).pdf
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/4805312319/ref=oh_details_o04_s00_i01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
Enjoy!
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Coup-d%C3%89tat-Practical-Handbook-Revised/dp/0674737261/ref=pd_sbs_14_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=YHMJ10C4NXAJY6Y5E4W7
3/5 for the quality of the fanfic, but thanks for putting in the effort on the write-up.
But, if you actually want to read about what happens check out the excellent book by Ian Easton 'The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia'.
https://www.amazon.com/Chinese-Invasion-Threat-American-Strategy/dp/1546353259
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-playbook-for-conquering-taiwan/
Somebody (CIA lol) leaked the PLA manual on the Taiwan question to Easton. His analysis was the basis for this book.
This is THE book on WW2-era tank warfare, written by Heinz Guderian
Tanks are literally my favorite things to talk about, so I feel like weve got a good pair going on.
A good book on the general history of armored warfare is
Camp Colt to Desert Storm, which is a collection of essays detail the development of tanks in the United States from 1917 to today.
If you want to understand how tanks changed the battlefield, I would really recommend Heinz Guderian's Achtung, Panzer! which details the use of tanks in World War One, and how Guderian felt they should develop on the verge of World War Two. Its an extremely influential book, and a primary source!
There are a number of books which focus on generally technology and tactics which can get really obtuse, not for a general reader. Rather, to see how tanks were used in combat, and to see how technology affected warfare, I would suggest you examine several campaigns and battles, including the battle of Amiens, Cambrai, France 1940, Kursk, Lake Balaton, Operation Cobra, and Desert Storm. If you compare those engagements (especially Desert Storm or the Fall of France) to engagements fought during World War One, such as the Marne, Somme, and Verdun, you can see how automotive technology radically altered the battlefield.
A good general summary of one of those campaigns would be Russell Weigley's Eisenhower's Lieutenants which explores the American campaign in Normandy. Examine closely the early stages of the campaign and the later breakout from Normandy to see the real advantage of mobile, tank heavy forces.
Also, if you have any technological questions Id be happy to answer them.
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B002ACSNQE/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_search_asin_title?ie=UTF8&psc=1
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0813124379/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_search_asin_title?ie=UTF8&psc=1
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/9562915719/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o05_s00?ie=UTF8&psc=1
this one so you know what will be used against you https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226841510/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o05_s01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
From Mao Tse-tung
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0252068920/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o05_s01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
this one would be one of the better ones for HK https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0813124379/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o05_s01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0873649214/ref=ppx_yo_dt_b_asin_title_o05_s01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1574885553/ref=ppx_od_dt_b_asin_title_s01?ie=UTF8&psc=1
There are others, but these were handy from my collection.
This is right in my wheelhouse! My own expertise on the war in the Pacific is mainly naval, but yes, I know some good books about that!
I would recommend, first of all, Clayton James' essay American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War, located in Peter Paret's Makers of Modern Strategy, which provides exactly what you are looking for. After that, I recommend George Baer's One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890 - 1990 (the relevent sections, obviously; not the whole thing) and Doug Smith's Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way for a good overview of the US Navy's role in the development of American strategy, policy, and operations against Japan, as well as how interwar Navy PME influenced their thinking on these issues.
David Evans and Mark Peattie's Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887 - 1941 is absolutely imperative for any kind of understanding of the Imperial Japanese Navy's strategic, institutional, and doctrinal shortcomings as they were eventually revealed during WWII. And I highly recommend Ron Spector's Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, which also offers excellent analysis on the comparative merits and shortcomings of Japanese and US naval strategy.
Gerhard Weinberg's A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II is a bit daunting (1200 pages!) but provides the single best overall review of the war, including the war in the Pacific. For a look at US Army strategy, I'd recommend the US Army Green Book Series on the war in the Pacific; these books were written by Army staff and historians in the decade or two following the war, and offer a perspective that is sometimes difficult to find in more recent works.
http://www.amazon.com/Achtung-Panzer-Cassell-Military-Classics/dp/0304352853
Still active in the education of US tank troops...so it seems it was kind of reversed.
Chris Hedges has a great book based on his life as a war reporter, War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. As you say, people in those situations feel a heightened sense of life, and then have a hard time adjusting to the world without that struggle.
The Sling and the Stone, though it's been a while since I've read it so I don't know how well it holds up today.
Some from my shelf
Arsenals of Folly
The Cold War
On China
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
NATO's Return to Europe
On War
Bonus: The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War
Short and simple answer: Germany was really really good at playing up the idea that they had a technological and numerical edge over the French and BEF. They also used a number of deceptive practices to convince the Allies they had more forces on their Western Frontier than they actually did. This gave the French and the British pause on any major offensive actions in Western Europe, and they decided that maintaining a defense posture against an inevitable German offensive was the best strategy for the time being.
Longer answer: As I previously mentioned, the French and the British forces deployed in France during the Phoney War didn't do much. The plan that had been agreed upon by both parties several weeks into the war was to build up their forces and maintain defensive positions in Western Europe, utilize the Maginot Line (which brief sidenote: worked as expected contrary to popular belief) and await the eventual German offensive, which they believed the main thrust of which would most likely come through the Low Countries. Attempts were made to get the Belgian government to allow the Allies to move into their territory to give themselves even more breathing room against a German offensive, but the Belgians, fearing a German invasion if they granted this request, denied it.
Now the French did engage in the Saar Offensive four days after the start of the war, but this operation was half-hearted at best. Initially it called for up to 40 divisions of the French Army to push rapidly into Western Germany. 30 Divisions did end up coming up to the border areas, but only 11 actually crossed into Germany, and even then, they only advanced 5 miles at the furthest before the decision was made to halt the advance and to undertake defensive positions before withdrawing entirely.
French forces eventually withdrew back to their starting positions along the Maginot Line, and aside from German counter attacks against gains the French continued to hold onto, no major offensives took place on the part of the Allies until the end of the Phoney War. This was in large part due to the idea that Germany held an advantage in air and manpower on the Western front, and that any attempts to offensively engage with or neutralize it would come at a high cost. Years of Nazi propaganda as well as common deception methods (making a big show of moving around the forces you did have, radio transmissions in the open to ghost divisions, etc) helped to mask the hollow shell that was Germany's forces in Western Germany while operations in Poland took place (and while they recovered, the invasion of Poland took did take its toll on Germany's military) were mostly to thank for the Allies decision to dig in and wait.
The irony in all of this, is that Germany only had about 23 divisions at the ready to defend against any Allied offensive into Germany while operations in Poland continued to take place. The Luftwaffe also had significant shortages of aircraft in Western Germany at this time due to having the majority of its ground attack aircraft deployed for operations in Poland. Had the Allies known that they held a significant manpower and airpower advantage, it's still hard to say if they would have undertaken any major offensive operations against Germany. Though the opportunity to hamper if not defeat Germany was certainly there during the Phoney War.
If you're interested, I recently spoke at length about all of this on the AskHistorians Podcast. Check it out here!
Sources:
The Rise of Germany, 1939-1941 (The War in the West) by James Holland
Case Red: The Collapse of France by Robert Forczyk
Why the Allies Won by Richard Overy
Makers of Modern Strategy
http://www.amazon.com/Makers-Modern-Strategy-Machiavelli-Nuclear/dp/0691027641
He was a part of the XX Counter Espionage division working for the Allies. By D-Day, literally every German "spy" in Britain was actually a double agent working for the Allies. They actually played a huge role in duping the Germans into taking their attention off of Normandy for the D-Day invasions.
Read the book Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies for more crazy stories. Plays out almost like a wartime Ocean's Eleven.
http://www.amazon.com/Double-Cross-Story-D-Day-Spies/dp/0307888770
[Kendo: A Comprehensive Guide to Japanese Swordsmanship by Geoff Salmon] (https://www.amazon.com/Kendo-Comprehensive-Guide-Japanese-Swordsmanship/dp/4805312319/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1521676294&sr=8-1&keywords=kendo+a+comprehensive+guide+to+japanese+swordsmanship)
Very interesting and informative book. Covers everything from proper etiquette to wazas to how to put on bogu. My sensei gave me a copy.
For an extensive, yet easily digestible, background on the Allied deception operation that preceded D-Day, read Ben Macintyre's book Double Cross (https://www.amazon.com/Double-Cross-Story-D-Day-Spies/dp/0307888770/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1482957362&sr=8-2&keywords=double+cross).
Allied spies were able to essentially trick the Germans into thinking the invasion was going to be somewhere other that Normandy (primarily Calais) and then continue the deception DURING the beginning of the invasion, which kept German armored units from being sent to reinforce Normandy while Allied troops reinforced the beachhead. When the Allies got their foothold, it was over for the Germans.
The British controlled every single German spy in the UK for years leading up to the invasion. The Germans were fed rubbish.
Other things:
EDIT: If I get a chance I'll take a picture of my survival pack. People think I'm crazy but never hurts to be prepared.
Two of my favorite books are called the The Sling and the Stone and Utility of Force.
Both are pretty easy straightforward reads. They are military men and just want to explain in the easiest way possible.
They are free in gen.lib.rus.ec
A great question. And I can see that there are now two Mongo experts in the field of battle!
Subutai/Tusobodai as he was actually called, overran more territory than any known commander in the history of warfare.^1
He did this through his sheer brilliance in logistical and imaginative strategy. If Genghis Khan was the soul of the Mongolian Empire through its rise. One can argue that it was Subotai who later wielded the sword that allowed the Mongolians to conquer nearly half of Europe, nearly all of Asia and the only nation thus far to have defeated the descendants of the Russian people (The Empire of Rus)
Subutai also used unconventional tactics that at our age would seem very normal and common sense, but Subutai would later be recorded as arguably the very first commander to use Siege weapons in an offensive manner in a non-siege battle. You could almost say that he was the first to use artillery in the ancient world.^2
If you have any more questions I can definitely answer them too!!
It's a great question.
This sort of thing is going to have some pretty big variations depending on the country in question, and even the individual commanders too.
For Germany, you might try reading "Achtung, Panzer!" by Heinz Guderian, which was his book about armored warfare.
It would also help to learn what kind of forces exactly make up a Division, so that you can gain an insight into how they would be used, and what the Division itself is capable of.
Channels like "Military History Visualized" are pretty good for gaining an overview of such information.
Here's his video on the Panzergrenadier Division.
Here's his video on the German tank Division.
Soviet Red Army Tank Division
US Army Tank Division
Of course these are brief, but I hope you find them interesting!
I'm just going to leave this here.
It's a pretty interesting book, I was working on a fantasy book that involves a coup and got it for research.
The most prominent book on the subject - ['Coup D'Etat] (https://www.amazon.com/Coup-d%C3%89tat-Practical-Handbook-Revised/dp/0674737261/ref=pd_sim_14_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=M9AWGX6YMAYW08JSEXT8) by Luttwak states that coup leaders need to have the support of mid-level military leaders and control over units nearest to the nexus of power ie Washington DC.
So, unless the coup leaders are able to subvert the loyalty of serious elements of the US military (which is difficult as it is a conservative, volunteer organisation), their coup will fail.
Weaponizing Anthropology David H. Price
https://www.amazon.com/Weaponizing-Anthropology-Science-Militarized-Counterpunch/dp/1849350639
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/484365/pdf
24 years ago was a better time for me as well.
"The Prince" [Niccolò Machiavelli]
"The Demon-Haunted World [Carl Sagan]
"Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid" [Douglas Hofstadter]
"On War" [Carl von Clausewitz]
"Intuition Pumps And Other Tools For Thinking" [Daniel C. Dennett]
I am not sure why everyone thinks Rommel was the greatest German general. He is often touted as such, because he is the one US and UK had to fight - and he was good, but the best? Hardly. Hitler's main goal in 1941 was defeating USSR. Africa was very, very, very far down the priority list. Why then Rommel was in Africa? Second of all, the masterminds behind Blitzkrieg are these guys:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian
Rommel was a brilliant tactic, that's all. Strategy was developed by people like von Bock, von Kleist, etc.
I highly recommend this book btw:
http://www.amazon.com/Achtung-Panzer-Cassell-Military-Classics/dp/0304352853/ref=la_B001ITYGCU_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1407667545&sr=1-2
I started kendo about three months ago, so I can tell you where I'm at:
Footwork, footwork, footwork. Every week most of the time is spent on footwork and yet I still don't feel confident about it. I know I'm improving because my sensei said so, but I feel like I have a long way to go before I can even begin to feel confident in it. Ki-ken-tai-ichi is still not there for me.
At my dojo we had shinai from the very first day, and we practice swinging in each class as well. The first few weeks were men-focused, but we moved on to kote, and dou most recently. Dou is taking some time to learn to do properly.
My stamina has definitely improved, and I notice a bigger improvement if I practice several times throughout the week rather than just at class. Now I can actually make it to the end of class without feeling like I'm going to pass out! Initially, however, it was definitely a struggle. Just after the half hour warm-up I would be completely exhausted.
I still wear work-out clothes (no hakama/keikogi yet) and own no bogu. However, my sensei did start encouraging people to buy their own bokken just last week.
Early on, I bought this book to help me learn all the terminology. I highly recommend it - it has helped me immensely.
Need to include the manual in the list: https://www.amazon.com/Coup-dÉtat-Practical-Handbook-Revised/dp/0674737261
It's not a simple of guerrilla warfare. The type of warfare encountered in Vietnam is often referred to as fourth generation warfare (4GW). 4GW involves a series of complex strategies working together to both discredit and demoralize an opponent.
I would argue that a bigger aspect in 4GW is discrediting an opponent. We saw how this worked on both sides in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Originally the Palestinians gained the upper hand in part because they were able to win the political war. The Palestinians took great lengths to make themselves look like the good guys who were effectively peaceful individual armed with little more than sticks and stones going up against the heavily armed Israelis. Strategists on the Palestinian side ensured that very few actual weapons were used by its fighters and make it a point to accuse the Israelis of using live ammunition (when oftentimes they were using rubber ammunition). They also invited reporters in the Palestinian region and gave them open access to everybody but ensured the most eloquently spoken individuals were readily available to talk with those reporters. Those interviewees made sure to discuss their desire to simply stop the fighting and left out any claims of wanting to destroy Israel or hurt Israelis. This strategy paid off and won the Palestinians a great deal of international sympathy.
Then the tables turned. Arafat returned from Tunisia to Palestine after the initial uprising had mostly concluded. After arriving he started discussing his desire to destroy Israel and wipe its people off of the face of the Earth. Suddenly Israel was able to wield international support. It was able to point to Arafat and his people as proof that the Palestinians wanted to destroy Israel and that conflicts between the two regions were merely acts of Israeli self-defense. The Israeli government made sure to point out that peaceful coexistence is impossible when one side has a desire to entirely wipe out the other side. Rather quickly international support began swinging behind Israel.
Many people who talk about guerrilla warfare in the United States forget about the political side. Guerrilla tactics can chip away at an enemy's morale but it can also fuel their propaganda machine. It's trivial to make random bombings look like vicious acts of wanton destruction. Properly spun guerrilla tactics can be a boon for the target as they can use attacks to argue that the war is purely self-defense in nature.
Most of the people who talk about guerrilla warfare against the United States government are poor at developing sympathy from bystanders. Instead they typically come off as being rather dickish. In the eyes of the general public this makes any military action the United States government takes against advocates of revolution justified.
If you want to have a serious discussion about waging war against the United States government you need to invest more time in public opinion. You need to set yourself up to be the reasonable individuals in the eyes of the public. Like the Palestinians during the first Intifada you must make it appear as though you're striving for peace at any cause and merely taking defensive action against the great bully of the United States government. That's a far different game than most revolutionaries seem to play. Instead they seem to favor the "I wish the motherfucker would" style, which is to say they make it appear as though they want to fight the United States government. Without public support for your side guerrilla warfare is unlikely to succeed.
I checked em out...
["The Military Revolution" ]
(http://www.amazon.com/Military-Revolution-Innovation-Rise-1500-1800/dp/0521479584/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396059549&sr=1-4&keywords=Geoffrey+Parker)
by
[Geoffrey Parker]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geoffrey_Parker_(historian))
["Battles of the 30 years war"]
(http://www.amazon.com/Battles-Thirty-Years-War-Contributions/dp/0313320284/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396059822&sr=1-1&keywords=battles+of+the+30+years+wars)
by
[William Guthrie]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Guthrie_(historian))
["Warfare in the 17th century"]
(http://www.amazon.com/Warfare-Seventeenth-Century-Smithsonian-History/dp/006089170X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396060084&sr=1-1&keywords=Warfare+in+the+17th+century)
by
[John Childs]
(http://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n82-90965/)
["History of the art of war"]
(http://www.amazon.com/Medieval-Warfare-History-Art-War/dp/0803265859/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396066515&sr=1-1&keywords=History+of+the+art+of+war)
by
[Hans Delbruck]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Delbruck)
["Infantry Attacks"]
(http://www.amazon.com/Infantry-Attacks-Marshall-Erwin-Rommel/dp/1607963353/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396066713&sr=1-1&keywords=Infantry+Attacks)
by
[Erwin Rommel]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Rommel)
["Achtung Panzer"]
(http://www.amazon.com/Achtung-Panzer-Cassell-Military-Classics/dp/0304352853/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396066882&sr=1-1&keywords=Achtung+Panzer)
by
[Heinz Guderian]
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian)
No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, by Bing West.
Amazon Link
It might seem facile or backwards, but willingness to engage with lethal force, and strong battlefield discipline are critical traits of elite units, and these traits are really not all that common nor easy to acquire.
During WW2, US army historian S.L.A. "Slam" Marshall developed a combat effectiveness metric he termed "ratio of fire". In his 1947 book "Men Against Fire", he made the following spectacular claim about US combat forces:
> In an average experienced infantry company in an average day's action, the number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per cent of the total strength. In the most aggressive companies, under the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 percent of the total strength from the opening to the close of the action.
Marshall's analysis was problematic at best (it is widely discredited today), but his work did highlight a frequently observed disconnect between a unit's expected combat performance, and observed outcomes. Military historian John Keegan's Soldiers describes a Napoleonic-era Prussian experiment, where a musket battalion demonstrated a 60% kill ratio at 75 yards when firing against targets, and a 2% kill ratio at 30 yards when firing against a human enemy. This same phenomenon has been noted in many other wars: Dave Grossman's "On Killing" describes how WW1 British Lieutenant George Roupell had to march up and down the trench hitting his men with his sword, ordering them to stop firing high, while US forces in Vietnam famously expended fifty thousand rounds for every enemy soldier killed. At Rorke's drift, British infantry were surrounded by Zulu warriors at close quarters, yet still managed a hit ratio barely over 10%. Whatever lies at the root of this behavior, an average soldier is not nearly as dangerous as his battle circumstances and weaponry might make him. Elite units do not display this gap (nor do crewed weapons).
Of course, soldiers do kill each other during war. As Carl von Clausewitz noted, the vast majority of combat casualties happen after a battle, when an enemy has routed and is at its most vulnerable. A unit that can maintain cohesion in the most dire circumstances can avoid the worst part of the battle, and garner an elite reputation. Among the North American Plains Indians, a warrior tradition called "counting coup" served as the measure of a tribe or individual's merit in war. Under this scheme, the highest act of bravery was touching an enemy with a hand or a stick, and escaping unscathed. This was, of course, most easily accomplished once the enemy had routed. This practice allowed the Plains Indians to engage in warfare without destroying each other.
Napoleon's Old Guard never fled the battlefield (they were ultimately annihilated at Waterloo after the Young Guard did rout). Alexander the Great dealt with several routing opponents, but never once panicked and fled himself. Smedley Butler never routed.
As far as how a unit can acquire these traits, sometimes it is via their commander. Napoleon, on the other hand, carefully used esprit de corps to grow the Guard into an elite fighting force. Professional military today use extensive training and conditioning (and snipers are always deployed as a team). In any case, once you realize that an untrained enemy's fire is probably about as dangerous as the bathroom guy in Pulp Fiction, you can focus all your effort on making him rout, at which point you'll be able to command the outcome.
If you're interested in Machiavelli's thoughts/ideas/impact on Europe (aside from his life), I'd recommend the article on him in the following book:
http://www.amazon.com/Makers-Modern-Strategy-Machiavelli-Nuclear/dp/0691027641/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1323205096&sr=8-1
Perhaps something like The Army Survival Manual? I know it has first aid, foraging, methods of getting water, and ways to build shelter.
> experts in the study of culture
Almost all of the people who are prominent in the field of anthropology have been funded for their entire careers by governmental and in most cases military agencies. Their credibility as an expert in anything besides how best to write a grant application and other similar bureaucratic functions is zilch, zip, nada, nothing, a great Big Void.
A recent poll suggests 90 percent of Native Americans are not offended by the nickname of Washington’s NFL franchise
I do not use the nickname. But I bet if I was a fan of the team I would use the nickname and people criticizing the nickname-users should go back to their third grade Sunday school lesson about the one who is without sin gets to throw the first stone.
Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State
Strategy by B.H. Liddell Hart sounds perfect for you. It's pretty dense but very detailed.
^This^ ...and Battle By John Lynn, The Military Revolution Debate: Readings On The Military Transformation Of Early Modern Europe Edited by Rogers, and Makers of Modern Strategy by Peter Paret
Mas se o governo tiver sido eleito democraticamente, aqueles que ousarem lutar pelo seus direitos naturais serão taxados de golpistas e/ou contra-revolucionários. Se o socialismo é a vontade da maioria da população, e eles expressam essa vontade através das instituições democráticas, fazer o caminho reverso é que fica complicado. Nós não estamos falando de um Vietnam do Sul que foi invadido por um Vietnam do Norte e virou um país socialista. E nem de uma Ucrânia que a União Soviética fez questão de matar de fome até que todos os opositores estivessem mortos. Estamos falando de um povo que foi às urnas e votou num socialista. Tá, eles fizeram uma escolha que eu julgo ser infeliz, daí eu tenho dois caminhos possíveis. Ou eu me articulo politicamente e tento reverter a situação politicamente e dentro de instituições democráticas, ou então eu faço como você sugere, e "continuo o intercurso político através de outros meios". E de maneira análoga, se Chavez quisesse ter ido profundamente em direção ao comunismo, ele poderia tê-lo feito, uma vez que ele tinha um congresso que o apoiava. Mas a questão é que dentro de um sistema democrático, nós pelo menos temos uma possibilidade de escolher como você quer lidar com a situação, coisa que não existia durante a Ofensiva do Tet.
E eu já disse, eu não concordo com isso. Pra mim Chavez/Maduro são ditadores abusando de instituições democráticas. Mas tem gente que discorda disso e eu quero entender porque. Eu só estou tentando racionalizar pelo mesmo caminho que um socialista. Pessoalmente eu acho isso ridículo. Mas eu estou tentando entender o ponto de vista oposto ao meu e tentando ver porque esse tipo de conclusão é válida para a esquerda. Portanto, se você quer debater esse assunto, sugiro que você procure alguém no /r/BrasildoB ou no /r/debatecommunism, mas faça isso com um minimo de coração aberto e tente entender o que e porque eles querem dizer isso. Isso faz parte de amadurecer suas próprias idéias políticas e econômicas.
If you're looking to read it, the Howard/Paret translation is the most common and readable translation. It was originally published in three volumes, but it is one work and is published now as the full text. Avoid the Penguin translation or any abridgments unless you need some kindling. Here's a link to the Howard/Paret translation on Amazon. http://www.amazon.com/War-Indexed-Carl-von-Clausewitz/dp/0691018545/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1457787735&sr=8-2&keywords=On+War
If you're looking for old three volume editions as collectibles, good luck.
There’s a very short book call War of the Flea by robert taber
It’s to the point, not as in depth as shadow1917’s post, but if you want a quick overview of specifically guerrilla war (vietnam and cuba) turning into a standing war then it’s helpful.
There’s also the Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella of Brazil.
I don’t know about any books on Focoism but an analysis of it would be interesting
Victory Point: Talks about Operations Red Wings and Whalers; really good book that tells you the other side about Lone Survivor, and how the Navy Seals were so into themselves that they ignored all recommendations about how to perform the operation.
War is a Force that gives up Meaning: Talks about those who experience war and how they become dependent on it (having served combat in Iraq, this book really stuck with me).
http://www.amazon.com/On-War-Carl-von-Clausewitz/dp/1469947021
On War by Clausewitz. Thee book about war!
A good book to read is, The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen. He explains in depth the cycle of insurgency.
But to answer OPs question. Yes military action is vital to ending terrorism. I look at terrorist groups no differently as gangs in the USA. They exist mainly because no effective government or order exists in those areas. If we stopped patrolling lets say Baltimore would you expect an increase or decrease in gang activity? You’d see an increase like we did after the Freddie Grey incident which led to a wave of homicides.
So can we flood the area with cops/military? In the short term yes it’ll suppress the gangs/terrorist. But in the long term you have to address/fix why they exist.
If this kind of thing interests you, read Double Cross by Ben Macintyre.
I found it to be a very interesting book about the espionage efforts in Europe.
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Paperback – ed. Peter Paret
That's if you want something more academic that the usual recommendations of Sun Tzu or Clausewitz.
Oh what specifically?
As far as East Asia/Indian Ocean stuff, Robert Kaplan is a pretty good introduction. His book Monsoon is a really good primer on the history of the Indian Ocean region, and it's ongoing (and increasing) importance in international politics. His new book Asia's Cauldron is promising, I haven't read it yet but it is a contemporary and forward looking take at the South China Sea and its role in shaping the future of international relations in the region. I actually just bought it the other day and will be reading it soon (spending the next 18-33 months abroad doing various things). Kaplan's books tend to be a very readable mix of history, personal anecdotes, and political analysis. Sometimes he can get a bit full of himself, especially in sections of Monsoon, but he does a great job at making what he writes accessible to a wide audience while still being at least interesting to read for academics.
For a primer on broad international relations, International Politics is a great starting point. This was my introduction to the field, and while it can be quite dense, it is very informative. It is a collection of essays and articles that is aimed at an intro level IR class (100 level), so while it is certainly on the academic side of things, it is still very approachable, so long as you have the patience to occasionally look up terms and concepts, for someone with no academic background in the subject.
As far as a general reading on grand strategy, I have only heard amazing things about Charles Hill's Grand Strategies. Basically it examines military grand strategy from a historical perspective, the politics behind the strategy, and also ties it into popular literature (such as Shakespeare) in order to make the concepts approachable and digestible for the average person.
For modern military theory that is applicable to today's world, and probably worth understanding given what has been going on in the world for the past decade and what continues to happen, you might be interested in David Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla. Kilcullen has two major books on insurgency, one is Counterinsurgency which is a higher level approach to the topic, while Accidental Guerrilla is a distillation of his observations and studies on counterinsurgency viewed put into a framework that would be easier for the average person to understand.
Admittedly I am a bit biased, as Francis Fukuyama is a family friend, but his latest works The Origins of Political Order and Political Order and Political Decay are great looks into how and why the state system arose, as well as flaws in political systems, corruption, etc.
His earlier (and more famous) book, The End of History and the Last Man is still a very interesting read, although without the proper framing it can be a bit odd in the current global political climate. It works off of a concept that I think is best described in Phillip Bobbit's The Shield of Achilles, which Bobbit terms the "long war". The grand concept of the Long War is that the game changing interstate conflicts throughout history have predominantly been between different types of states. It is a bit of a Darwinist look at state politics and political order, seeing different political models (democracy, communism, fascism, monarchy, etc) as directly competing, and there being a series of successors. The End of History works off of a similar premise, basically saying that once the Soviet Union collapses (it was originally formulated as a series of articles in the late 1980s), Liberal Democratic Capitalism would be the predominant political system, and that it would mark the "end of history" as we knew it up to that point. History had been dominated by massive regional and worldwide conflicts between states that often differed in structure, and that once all the major powers had pretty much gotten to the point of L-D-C, then interstate conflict as we knew it would cease to exist. Obviously conflict still exists, but it is much harder to imagine a World War III in todays world, despite tensions with Russian and China, than it would be just 30 years ago.
No, I totally agree with you that a surprise attack is impossible. I'm trying to make the point that surprise is necessary and maybe one of the biggest deterrents of an invasion. I'm not sure about the history of amphibious assaults but I think of D-Day and Normandy and necessity of surprise to succeed.
Ian Easton, a China expert, wrote an entire book about this possible scenario titled, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia. He says that the PLA,
"favors a minimal warning, rapid invasion campaign that employs deception and surprise to land on the island and overrun Taipei, securing the government’s capitulation before U.S.-led coalition forces could decisively engage.”
They've actually outlined and updated the scenario recently at FP.com. And they do mention the 1-million men invasion. The article says that PLA command believes they would need to attack and secure the island in no more than two weeks. Any longer and they assume the battle lost. It also assumes a lot of other things like anticipating and defending against US and Japanese counter campaigns.
Additionally, I'm not sure if it's been mentioned but another issue the PLA has to consider is Taiwan Straight is weather conditions:
"The invasion will happen in April or October. Because of the challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only make it across the strait in one of these two four-week windows."
Anyways, interesting article, lays out everything that's been discussed in greater detail and fancy charts.
I'm not all that up to date on modern military theory since most of my knowledge is from military history and not contemporary theory (although the two are, as one would expect, highly intersectional) - I do read some modern war journals and listen to talks on modern war theory though, although relatively rarely.
I'm hardly an expert on the matter (although I'm fairly certain know enough to recognize when someone has no idea what they are talking about). I just read a lot in college, and sucked up whatever I could from the library. I also liked reading a lot of primary sources, including things like reports from field exersises/war games/intel reports/naval excercises. One time I even read the entire
One of my favourites was this book on inter-war German reforms during the Weimar era. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is another favourite of mine (although I never got to read the whole thing, it's a fucking massive book and I never had the time so) - it's especially good if you want to see some of the economic factors of warfare and tracking them through history. Clausewitz' On War is a classic primer on military and is practically ubiquotous - but it's also old as fuck and is far more important for showing some of the roots of modern (in the broad sense of Victorian/post-Victorian, not 21st century) - treat it like you would The Wealth of Nations.
The section about Jamaica was absolutely wild. Honestly, reading that book, there were sections where I had to put it down for a second, go, "Jesus fucking Christ" and push back the existential terror, then continue on. Like the bit about how those raiders in Mumbai had to kill a lot of Westerners - not to prove any political point, but because the command center needed a big Twitter presence to provide on-the-fly intel to the raiders, and the easiest way to get Twitter to start paying attention was to kill people who are part of a network that uses Twitter. All those little details really blew my mind.
He doesn't paint a very hopeful picture for the future of the planet. On the flipside, though, the fact that a dude who participated in counter-insurgency operations can see clearly that a lot of future threats will be "wars without enemies" (or whatever he refers to resource scarcity/infrastructure failure as) is kind of heartening. His arguments about effective governance and management of infrastructure also kind of shows that the end game of counter-insurgency studies is basically going to be, "Govern fairly and give people what they need to live, then they won't try to kill you." It'll just be curious to see how many people like Kilcullen reach that logical conclusion.
I'm hopefully going to crack into The Accidental Guerrilla tonight.
War is a force that gives us meaning.
I'd recommend reading War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning. Pretty short read and you can find paperbacks for less than five bucks.
'War Is A Force That Gives Us Meaning', very much worth a read.
https://www.amazon.com/War-Force-that-Gives-Meaning/dp/1400034639
U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual. Leete la seccion sobre sabotaje. Ya sabes lo que tienes que hacer, if you know what I mean...
There was a brilliant book written about the Double-Cross system that anyone with an interest in that sort of thing should read.
Nice guy. Notice how he mentions studying Marx! and urban ecology.
what he is doing is called military anthropology
I've done a bit of reading on terrorism and the most commonly accepted definitions of terrorism actually seem to lack terror. Terrorism is an act of small military value with the intent to cause a greater political effect, mostly through fear or inspiration ("calls to action"). These Islamists are a new breed and certainly not the standard-bearer for terrorists. I liked these books, 1 and [2] (https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0520247094/ref=oh_aui_detailpage_o08_s00?ie=UTF8&psc=1)
While it was written in 1968, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook is easily convertible to a fantasy milieu. it's the strategy and tactics you want.
> France's defeat within mere weeks was unprecedented and shocked the world. However this stands more as evidence of Germany's sheer military power, and not as any nation's inherent 'weakness'.
Actually, depending on how you define "military power," it's not hard to argue that France was militarily more powerful than Germany in 1940. Two highly recommended books (links to reviews):
A choice quote from the first review:
> Ernest R. May, a professor of history at Harvard and the author of ''Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France,'' will have none of this. Panzer-like, he sweeps it aside as myth. France and its Allies, he points out, had more trained men, more guns, more and better tanks and more bombers and fighters than did Germany.
And from the second:
> Frieser argues persuasively that Germany took several huge risks by attacking France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (the Western Allies) on May 10, 1940. Germany was unprepared for anything more than a very short war and chose a strategy (thrusting through the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes, crossing the Meuse, and driving to the Atlantic Coast) that could have been frustrated in a half-dozen ways by the Western Allies, especially France. [...] Frieser's narration of Sichelschnitt is buttressed by extensive data--including production numbers, weapon comparisons and useful logistical information in addition to troop numbers and dispositions. The data and discussion serve to underline both the numerical and the marginal qualitative equipment inferiority of the Wehrmacht in 1940 relative to its Allied opponents.
In these arguments, the Germans were materially inferior to the French, and a big part of their victory was due to luck. The Germans' surprise attack through the Ardennes was a huge gamble; if the French had caught on to it earlier, the Germans would have lost catastrophically.
This isn't to take credit away from the Germans—luck smiles on those prepared to seize it, and they sure did seize it in those six weeks. But even though the Germans' military skill was higher than the French, it's hard to argue that that was enough to guarantee a crushing victory like they achieved.
Even if AQ does not exist in the manner you think it does, the ideology behind it is a driver for actions that people have undertaken. That means that it does exist and has had an effect on the world. You can deny that a main organization exists, or that they undertook certain actions, but you cannot deny that the idea of them has driven people to actions. That in itself means it exists in some way. I take it on step further and believe this idea was created by an organization in a way to propagate itself (Edit: Their ideology). My real world evidence comes from trusting of real world accounts presented to me second hand, but I do trust the sources that have encountered them in real life.
Further edit: Read this book and tell me this man has written several items on a related topic including a group that doesn't exist.
Books that I found really good are:
Kendo: A Comprehensive Guide to Japanese Swordsmanship
Kendo - Approaches for all Levels
Kendo Kata: Essence and Application I wish this would come back into print so it would be easy for people to get and less expensive.
Purchase the US Army Survival Manual. It's full of information about first aid, tracking and trapping animals, navigating, improvised shelters and water collection methods. I keep a copy of this in my backpacking pack at all times.
Also, make and keep a bug out bag (again, this is my backpacking pack). It should contain basic survival items like a water filtration and purification system, first aid kit, versatile clothing, sewing kit, non perishable food, a weapon and appropriate ammo, a good knife, some para cord, topographic maps of the area you intend to retreat to and planned route to escape the city if you live in one.
As for being part of a group, develop a skill that is valuable to other survivalists. A simple skill that will come in handy would be sewing. Clothes and shoes will need constant maintenance in the wilderness. Learning some basic blacksmithing and would be excellent for making tools. Understanding the basic mechanics of a firearm and how to repair one would also be immensely valuable. Take at least take a CPR & First Aid course. Learn how to navigate in the wilderness and how to predict weather patterns.
War Is a Force that Gives Us Meaning
--Chris Hedges
http://www.amazon.com/War-Force-that-Gives-Meaning/dp/1400034639
I'd switch out the Catcher in the Rye for this I have a copy and it has some real useful information. And no, it's not just for combat scenarios.
Looks like the dictator in your scenario has been doing some reading.....
> War is becoming automated. We don't march 40,000 troops across an open field to take a town anymore.
Do I have a book for you....
http://www.amazon.com/No-True-Glory-Frontline-Fallujah/dp/0553383191
It's never okay. Here, read "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual" and it will educate you on how you defeat a terrorist/insurgent force, here's a hint, it involves not killing civilians.
"War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning"
Great book
http://www.amazon.com/War-Force-that-Gives-Meaning/dp/1400034639/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1393981296&sr=8-1&keywords=war+is+a+force+that+gives+us+meaning
I wouldn't plan on killing people either and I'm not defending suicide bombers. You might benefit from reading The Accidental Guerrilla. It might give you a broader view on the world.
Strategy: The Indirect Approach - by B. H. Liddell Hart - this was required reading for Israeli military officers for many years.
A flippant response might read "Your list, with 'The Annotated' [0 - 4] prepended to each entry". Less glibly, I concur with /u/dvdvh, that it is necessary to build a broad recognition of the landscape of history before one goes exploring the geological forces that shaped it. This can be accomplished by picking your favorite time, place, or culture, querying a suitable encyclopedia entry, taking notes if desired, and expanding from there; I personally find the histories of Hungary [5] and Uzbekistan (Sogdiana/Transoxiana) [6] to hold criminally low profiles in the lay-historian's mindset.
For historical perspectives orthogonal to any one physical dimension, I would recommend military histories, which, truer to your own suggestions, can be classical original sources, e.g. Xenophon's "Anabasis" [7], so long as one is willing to research details assumed known by the authors. B. H. Liddell Hart's "Strategy" [8] specifically takes the position that military science prerequisites a knowledge of precedents, and so provides it.
[0] https://www.amazon.com/Iliad-Homer-Annotated-H-ebook/dp/B005Y0MWUC
[1] https://www.amazon.com/Divine-Comedy-Translated-Annotated-Illustrated-ebook/dp/B00SIWHOWO
[2] On this point I must bend "The Annotated" to "The Reader's Companion to": https://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-Companion-Cervantes-Companions-Literature/dp/0521663873
[3] https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/019953621X/
[4] https://www.amazon.com/Fyodor-Dostoyevsky-Annotated-critical-Biography-ebook/dp/B0057JQ206
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Hungary
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan
[7] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Anabasis
[8] https://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Meridian-B-Liddell-Hart/dp/0452010713
Are you reading "A Spy Among Friends" by Ben Macintyre? His last book, Double Cross is a fascinating, compulsively readable history of the British double agent system developed and run by MI5 during WWII. Philby makes several appearances throughout the story.
I'd also recommend Spycatcher by Peter Wright, former assistant director of MI5, which details his career as a counterespionage operative in Post-War England. It was famously suppressed by the Thatcher administration upon initial release due to the fact that it named names and embarrassed many senior members of the British Intelligence services.
Forgot to also mention, I have about 3 copies of this in various locations. Incredible resource that has been of use plenty of times. Once, stranded on Short Key during a monster storm it was used as kindling for a fire (one of the reasons it is printed on untreated paper).
Seriously, go buy a copy now.
>WW2 is a perfect example of logistics winning the war.
>
~>Turns out when you have enough bombs/napalm to remove four/five of their cities it isn't that hard to win the war.
Preeminent historians would disagree with those statements.
Dunno where you're getting this 2-wwek idea. Your information may be outdated. This book is based on the most up to date analysis from military experts on both sides. It doesn't mention that at all, but does state that in most scenarios run by the military, Taiwan emerges the victor. https://www.amazon.com/Chinese-Invasion-Threat-American-Strategy/dp/1546353259
https://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Meridian-B-Liddell-Hart/dp/0452010713
The US took a break to have an election in 2004...and it wasn't going all that well in the first place. Source
Although I do not have a detailed understanding, I found the following interesting (I interpreted it as, the outcome of the initial invasion could (should?) have been completely different, subject to the outcome of initial engagements/strategies), that you may also:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign/dp/1591142954
I'd say sadly most of the interesting sources are in french and not really translated. And sometimes out of print in France too.
I know the blitzkrieg legend about the 1940 campaign, but it's about military stuffs. Maybe it's too specific for you.
On War, by Carl von Clausewitz
Here is the desktop version of your link
For a more tactical point of view you have Heinz Guderian's treatise on armored warfare; Achtung - Panzer! In it, he crafts the very tactics that were employed in the war.
Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck is also quite good and may be more what you're looking for. Hans von Luck was a commander in Rommel's Panzer divisions at many points in the war including El Alamein, during D-Day, and on the eastern front.
Recommended gunnit books?
May I suggest:
https://www.amazon.com/Gun-C-J-Chivers/dp/0743271734
and
https://www.amazon.com/War-Flea-Classic-Guerrilla-Warfare/dp/1574885553
Also related, this book actually sources from Chinese and Taiwan publications. Its kind of a fascinating read, from the Chinese perspective on how to mount the Taiwan invasion and to sum up, it's going to be a pain in the ass. It doesn't matter if you have a million troops if you don't have enough ships to carry them they might as well be useless.
Apparently the Taiwan Strait is not ideal for amphibious landing because of the weather, also there's few good landing beaches (which are all monitored and their terrain has been modified over the years), and because of human intelligence any invasion efforts would be easily noticeable.
I actually guessed Cyprus from reading Chris Hedges book War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. Thanks; I love stuff like this.
This video is a decent introduction to the topic, mainly focusing on tank production (the part before the timestamp is about the battle of Kursk, mostly). Why The Allies Won has a chapter that's fairly in-depth about the differences in production methods as well.
It's hyperbolic, but he is a very good general and did literally write the book on counterinsurgency.
https://www.amazon.com/Marine-Corps-Counterinsurgency-Field-Manual/dp/0226841510
Pretty amazing book about this very topic. Not as much about the logistics but the philosophy of the topic. Not a happy read but worth it.
http://www.amazon.com/War-Force-that-Gives-Meaning/dp/1400034639
Here is why I'm not wrong regarding these issues:
Torture is less effective than other methods of interrogation as you can see in the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, and testimony from former FBI agents. However, more importantly, torture is immoral and violates the principals on which America was founded.
If you're suggesting I'm wrong about Trump supporting torture, I would suggest that you read the following articles:
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/trump-torture/
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/06/politics/donald-trump-torture/
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-torture-waterboarding_us_5775d740e4b04164640f6597
----
Attacking civilians, like torture, undermines America's long standing position that it tries to be a force for good. Additionally, it radicalizes large portions of the populace of any nation we are in against us; since people are unsure if they will be targeted and are more likely to know people who died. For better options, I'm going to suggest reading David Kilcullen's books Counterinsurgency and The Accidental Guerrilla.
Here is evidence that Trump supports attacking civilians:
https://thinkprogress.org/trump-i-would-intentionally-kill-families-to-defeat-isis-b5484a36a7a2#.o3xtgsik4
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-reiterates-sire-to-murder-terrorists-families-a6912496.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/politics/donald-trump-mosul-iraq.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/11/donald-trump-wants-a-sneak-attack-on-mosul-but-reality-is-more-complicated/
----
Regarding climate change, I'm going to link NASA's page regarding it as it contains more links and evidence than I would take the time to link here.
These articles demonstrate that Trump does consider climate change a hoax:
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climate-change-chinese-h/
https://www.factcheck.org/2016/11/the-candidates-on-climate-change/
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Though Stop & Frisk may find some criminals, it was clearly racist in its implementation. Despite finding white criminals at a higher rate than black or hispanic criminals, whites were stopped far less.
Here is Trump supporting Stop & Frisk:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/nyregion/what-donald-trump-got-wrong-on-stop-and-frisk.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/28/trumps-false-claim-that-stop-and-frisk-was-not-ruled-unconstitutional/
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
I got my undergrad in History (with an emphasis on Military History) and am working on a masters in Military History. My last class was Military Though and Theory, and we read Makers of Modern Strategy. I LOVED the book. Also, if you're gonna buy Clausewitz, be sure to get the Howard/Paret version.
Two badasses talking about one badass's actions that earned him a spot amongst the Gods? Hngggggg
Also, if you guys haven't already, definitely check out all of Bing West's other books, especially No True Glory. He paints a very real, vivid, accurate, and what I feel is non-biased picture of Iraq at the time, as well as how Fallujah came to fall [and eventually be retaken].
It also chronicles the life of one of daily inspirations.
For tips on this exact subject, check out Richard Overy's book Why the Allies Won - it's an excellent summary of why the Allies won World War II, and a number of ways that allied manpower, organization, technology, industry, and morale contributed to allied victory. Even with a super-metal, Germany could likely have caused more damage, conquered more territory, but still lost the war.
War Is A Force That Gives Us Meaning by Chris Hedges.
A succinct essay about the horror of war and its paradoxical allure.
Matterhorn by Karl Marlantes.
Probably one of the best war novels I've ever read. Based on the author's own experiences as a platoon leader in Vietnam.
Also, most senior officers put out public reading lists every year - so you might try searching that way too.
The one i red was in turkish and had 750+ pages. This link has 700+ pages so i think this should be true.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691018545?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0691018545&linkCode=xm2&tag=theclausewitzhom
Sorry for long wait :( i'm a sailor, couldnt check earlier.
War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning
The truth is that we pink monkeys crave war and seek to create the conditions for it.
The historical mess in the middle east will not be resolved until something drastic happens; the history of Israel in the region is one of repeated bellus interruptus (to coin a phrase) where hostilities started, but were stopped by external forces before being resolved...
At least that's what I think on more cynical days. (like today)
Read about the Soviet T-34 tank. It was the most deadly tank of WWII and practically won the war on its own.
German generals were in complete shock during its introduction on the Eastern Front. You can read some of their thoughts in various books:
https://www.amazon.com/Achtung-Panzer-Cassell-Military-Classics/dp/0304352853
"We had nothing comparable", Major-General F.W. Mellenthin, Chief of Staff of XLVIII Panzer Corps.
"The finest tank in the world", Field-Marshal Ewald von Kleist, First Panzer Army.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVg6gFmuRlE
Learn some history.
I am only answering further because I looked at your artwork and it is nice, and it seems you did not pursue the anthropology thing further, which is a good thing. So there's the possibility you're not completely aligned with the US anthropology cult, with its known problems, prejudices and motivations.
I am glad you pointed out various Maya are still around, this is important to educate people on. After all, if they weren't around any more, who would the US have to finance the assassination of in central america through ongoing genocidal schemes?
Your follow up statement that "I'm led to believe that their view of the downfall would be as varied as the countries across which they are spread" does suggest that you have in fact talked to Maya people, and are aware that there was no "collapse" at all, and are aware there is no single Mayan people, and are aware that the ongoing changes in various Maya cultures in history, like the histories of most cultures, aren't particularly sudden or mysterious. These were the main issues with your previous post.
Maya peoples know their history, have maintained their oral and written records, and there is no huge mystery of their history.
There is only the american anthropologists and archaeologists who continue to claim that there is a mystery here or there, while they ignore actual history kept by non-white and non-american peoples. (I qualify this with 'white' because the non-white american anthropologists I know do not have this belief, nor do the non-american white anthropologists.) These are bizarre claims and are among the many reasons that american anthropologists are regarded with skepticism and ridicule by much of the rest of the world anthropological communities.
Worthwhile reading to decolonize the minds of those who have been through US or similarly minded anthro programs.
Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State
From Racism to Genocide: Anthropology in the Third Reich
Darkness in El Dorado
Custer Died for Your Sins
Indians and Anthropologists
Read all these. Then proceed.
Not being petty; read this book and about 70 others
https://www.amazon.com/Why-Allies-Won-Richard-Overy/dp/039331619X