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> For government supporters, as well as those who depend on the state for subsidized food and other assistance, there are few incentives to express dissent or participate in opposition-led protests, since doing so may result in the loss of their livelihood. The government relies on intimidation, threats, and coercion for votes, and in September 2017 it introduced a new identity document called the Carnet de la Patria, which promised benefits like food and medicine in exchange for loyalty to the regime.
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> For Maduro critics who receive benefits, the potential individual costs of participation contribute to a collective action problem (or “free rider problem”)—a situation in which people are individually better off trying to benefit from a public good without contributing to it. Thus, although Venezuelans across the country may share a common interest in removing Maduro and ushering in democratic transition, protest is most often limited to the middle and upper classes. Why protest and risk losing government benefits if you believe other people will either achieve a democratic transition without your help, or fail to achieve a transition at all?
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> From above
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> Given the unlikelihood of transition from below, Venezuela’s political opposition, the Lima Group, and other international actors have set their sights on inducing top-down change through a combination of sticks and a few carrots. This type of transition characteristically stems from self-imposed government liberalization, carried out by a government which seeks to reinforce itself and in doing so may inadvertently bring about democratization.
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> This strategic miscalculation from autocrats is more common than it might first appear. Latin American history is replete with examples of top-down liberalization in which dictators relaxed repression, allowed some civil liberties, and began negotiations with pro-democratic opposition elites. This includes the re-democratization of Ecuador (1976-1979), Brazil (1982-1985), Uruguay (1983-1984), and Chile throughout the 1980s. Similar processes occurred in Poland and with the reunification of Germany in 1989.
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> Liberalization often results from a split in the authoritarian regime between “hard-liners” (in this case Nicolás Maduro, Jorge and Delcy Rodríguez, Tareck El Aissami, Diosdado Cabello) and moderate “soft-liners” (Héctor Rodríguez, Aristóbulo Isturiz). In most cases, the hardline authoritarian leader faces pressure due to declining economic conditions or social unrest, and soft-liners rise to prominence. Whereas hard-liners tend to be satisfied with the status quo, moderates may prefer to liberalize and broaden the social base of the dictatorship in order to gain allies and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the hardliners.
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> If a split occurs in the ruling regime and the soft-liners gain control, they must decide whether to liberalize the regime or stick with the status quo. The former entails actions like controlled opening of the political space, holding elections, (re)opening the legislature, or (re)establishing an independent judiciary. The goal is not to bring about democracy, but rather to incorporate opposition groups into authoritarian institutions to co-opt or divide them.
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> The problem from the regime’s perspective is that liberalization is inherently unstable. If government moderates liberalize, opposition groups can accept the concessions and enter the institutions of this “broadened dictatorship.” However, these groups may also decide to exploit their new freedoms to further organize against the regime. If this occurs, then the authoritarian elites have two choices: increase repression, or allow democratic transition. The outcome is a function of the opposition’s strength: a well-organized, unified opposition tends to encourage a democratic transition, while a weak, divided opposition is more likely to incur further repression and lead to a hardliner resurgence.
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> Several states and international organizations are trying to influence the political calculus of regime supporters in order to encourage a top-down transition in Venezuela. So far, they have not succeeded. Since the 2017 protests, the United States, Canada, and other states have issued targeted sanctions against government officials and key Maduro allies in an effort to bring Maduro to the negotiating table. Additionally, the United States issued broader sanctions against Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), in January 2019, then escalated its pressure in August 2019 by blocking all property and assets of the government and its officials and prohibiting any third-party transactions with them, in an attempt to get civilian and military Chavista allies to defect from the government.
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> This strategy has run into difficulties. First, the combination of a hegemonic, closed authoritarian regime and a weakened civil society means that the government has increased repression as an alternative to liberalization. Recent history has borne this out: the government responded to large-scale social mobilization in 2016, 2017, and 2019 by systematically jailing dissenters and even killing protestors.
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> There is also a deeper problem impeding liberalization and the top-down transition model, despite attempts at both negotiations and using force: there are few moderate Chavistas in positions of power. Since 2013, Maduro has purged his government of moderates and surrounded himself with hardliners who are not only intent on continuing Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution, but who are also committed to remaining in power. Without this group, and in the absence of free elections, a split in the ruling coalition may lead to the removal of Maduro, but it also raises the risk of him being replaced with other hardliners, either military or civilian. This is what makes U.S. dealings with Diosdado Cabello stand out, since the democratic transitions literature argues that a more certain strategy would be to pull away and negotiate with moderate elements from the regime, not with the person most likely to renege on a deal or take over power himself.
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> Moving Forward
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> International allies of Juan Guaidó and the Venezuelan opposition have struggled to find a successful strategy for re-democratization. They correctly recognize that an effective transition will first require some fracturing in the ruling coalition, together with concrete action taken by the opposition to make it more attractive for the government to step down than to hold on to power. International actors could accelerate that break by furthering the economic pressure on government supporters; alternatively, the ongoing economic crisis or poor coalition management could force a break to happen organically.
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> Models of strategic interaction suggest that, if they want to maximize the possibility of re-democratization, Guaidó and the international community must court moderate Chavistas. Moderate Chavismo will undoubtedly be a key part in any regime liberalization, and should be an integral part of Venezuela’s post-transition political future as well. Accepted wisdom says that without finding those moderates and breaking the governing coalition, the authoritarian status quo is likely to prevail. Thus, if the reported U.S. negotiations with Diosdado Cabello are successful, it would be not only be a pleasant surprise for the people of Venezuela, but would also be a data point against what political scientists think we know.
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No problem at all implied. But it was pretty funny to read Ian Bruce's book description on the back cover: "Venezuela has become a huge source of inspiration for the Left throughout the world."

Invariably, an used book store will have old books, but here are some I recommend:

Benesuela vs. Venezuela: el combate educativo del siglo

Venezuela Before Chávez: Anatomy of an Economic Collapse

¡Llegó la Hora!

Tengo muchos pensamientos similares a los tuyos, algo que aprendi es que ir a terapia no es "de locos", y realmente ayuda MUCHO mas de lo que crees que la necesitas. Todavia me falta recorrer mas de mi camino pero ahora al menos puedo reconocer y entender mis emociones un poco mas.

Este libro me ha ayudado en momentos dificiles: A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy

Bien. le voy a echar ojo.

Yo ahorita estaba estudiando lo mismo pero leyendo Growing Object-Oriented Software, Guided by Tests. Esta bien bueno tambien ese libro. Lo vi recomendado por el tipo que creó Angular.js en este GoogleTechTalk: How to Write Clean, Testable Code. Tambien recomiendo ese talk

Podría servir este?
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00768SBAU/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_apis_1495054251484
O este?
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00AJHDZSI/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_apis_1495054361669

El de Cormen es uno de los que más se usan a nivel de postgrado.

Por mucho es lo más completo qué hay.

Edit: aquí está https://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Algorithms-3rd-MIT-Press/dp/0262033844

Aún no me d3cido. Pero probablemente sean estos.

https://www.amazon.com/SteelSeries-Arctis-Wired-Gaming-Headset/dp/B07S9886QV/ref=mp_s_a_1_2?keywords=steelseries+artic+1&qid=1568834379&s=gateway&sr=8-2

Le invito a que se lea este libro:
http://www.amazon.com/Lightning-Protection-Iet-Power-Energy/dp/0863417442

Aunque, para entenderlo, va a tener que leerse este:
http://www.amazon.com/Fundamentals-Electric-Circuits-Charles-Alexander/dp/0073380571

Y este:
http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Electrodynamics-4th-David-Griffiths/dp/0321856562

Si le parece que la inversion de tiempo es demasiada, y si me da por un momento el beneficio de la duda, dejeme decirle que no hay rayo en el mundo que pueda causar un incendo cuando el sistema de pararrayos esta bien diseñado y el mantenimiento es adecuado.

Es lo mismo de la red electrica nacional. Un desastre producto de la falta de mantenimiento y planificacion propia de la 5ta republica.

Ningun sistema aguanta la combinacion de incapacidad mas corrupcion.


Si no me cree a mi, preguntele a un ingeniero amigo suyo. Eso si, si no es chavista es preferible. Las posibilidades de que no sea un pirata son mejores.

Ese es un módem de DOCSIS 2.0. Desde hace tiempo vivo en usa y no se si intercable ahora estára mejorando a Docsis 3.0.

Sin embargo, te recomiendo que consigas uno más actualizado, like this one